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Preface
Observable worker characteristics that are supposed to account for diﬀerences between
worker productivities explain only about 30% of the variation in wages. The remaining
70% could be accounted for by unobservable worker characteristics. Systematic diﬀer-
ences in wages like the persistence of inter-industry wage diﬀerentials over time and
their similarity across countries (Katz and Summers, 1988), the firm-size wage eﬀect
(Davis and Haltiwager, 1996), and the change of the wage distribution over time after
accounting for observable worker characteristics (Katz and Autor, 1999) suggest that
similar workers are paid diﬀerently.
Using matched employer employee data sets Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis (1999)
and Abowd, Finer and Kramarz (1999) decompose industry and firm size diﬀerentials
into average employer and worker components. The importance of the average employer
eﬀect in explaining these systematic diﬀerences indicate that firms have some scope to
set a particular wage policy. As manifold as worker pay policies can be, so are the
diﬀerent wage formation assumptions used in diﬀerent theories. The use of diﬀerent
wage policies also suggests that workers cannot easily move between employers and
compare wage oﬀers. These mobility frictions have many diﬀerent sources. In the
following, I briefly discuss the diﬀerent driving forces governing the wage formation
process and the matching of workers and jobs.
Matching function
Pissarides (2000), in his book “EquilibriumUnemployment Theory”, argues that decen-
tralized trade in the labor market is characterized by coordination failure and involves
costly information acquisition about the productivity of workers and jobs as well as
vii
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their location. Backed by a lot of empirical evidence he suggests that the various fric-
tions can best be captured by a general matching function with constant returns to
scale. Similar to a production function, the inputs into a matching function, i.e. the
number of vacancies v and searching workers s, result in a specific number of matches
m (v, s). The number of matches divided by the number of vacancies gives the matching
probability for a vacancy and the number of matches divided by the number of search-
ing workers gives the matching probability of a worker. Using the constant returns to
scale assumption implies that the matching probability can be written as a function of
the labor market tightness θ = v/s defined as the ratio of vacancies to searching work-
ers. The matching probability of a worker increases in θ and the matching probability
of a vacancy decreases in θ.
Hall (1979), Pissarides (1979), Blanchard and Diamond (1994), and many other au-
thors including Acemolgu and Shimer (1999) have used the exponential form derived
from the urn-ball game as matching function. The urn-ball game assumes that work-
ers’ arrival at vacancies follows a Poisson process. Thus, with probability 1− e−1/θ at
least one worker applies for a vacancy and with the ex-ante probability
¡
1− e−1/θ
¢
/θ a
worker is oﬀered a job. While the derivation based on the urn-ball game is mechanical
Burdett, Shi, and Wright (2001) derive the matching function as the most stable mixed
strategy equilibrium in a model where sellers post prices and buyers decide whom to
visit given the observed prices. Other models deriving matching functions from prima-
tive assumptions include Montgomery (1991) who allows for strategic price setting of
firms that take the outside option of workers as given, Lagos (2000) who endogenizes
the moving decision of agents, Coles and Smith (1998) who propose an alternative
matching game where the stock of unemployed workers can only match with the flow
of incoming vacancies and vice versa.
Wage formation
The early search literature assumed an exogenously given wage dispersion to motivate
the searching process and they derived a reservation wage rule. In these models unem-
ployment arises because workers rejected low wage oﬀers. This led Rothschild (1973)
to his criticism that in equilibrium firms should not oﬀer wages that are not accepted
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and he asked for wage dispersion to be derived as an equilibrium outcome.
Diamond (1971) presented the first equilibrium search model where firms make
publicly not observable take-it-or-leave-it wage oﬀers to workers who have to decide
immediately whether to accept the wage oﬀer before sampling another oﬀer. This
sequential search assumption implies that workers cannot induce firms to compete
with their wage oﬀers. Furthermore, since wage oﬀers are not publicly observable
workers cannot chose which firm to contact. Thus, firms have all the bargaining power
and oﬀer a monopsony wage which takes away the incentive for workers to search.
This is called the Diamond paradox. By introducing bargaining over the match rent
Diamond (1982), Mortensen (1982) and Pissarides (2000) ensured that workers get
more than their reservation wage. Albrecht and Axell (1984), Salop and Stiglitz (1976)
and others introduced ex-ante heterogeneity in search cost, information acquisition cost
or production cost to generate a price or wage dispersion. However, the problem of
whether wage dispersion can exist in models with identical workers and firms remained.
In order to solve the Diamond paradox one strand of the literature introduced some
competition between firms by assuming that some workers get multiple oﬀers. They
maintained, however, the assumption that wage oﬀers are private information. The
non-sequential search models by Wilde (1977) and Burdett and Judd (1983) allow
workers to sample more than one job oﬀer before deciding. Given the non-sequential
search behavior of workers Burdett and Judd (1983) prove that a wage dispersion
exists if one proportion of workers sample only one job oﬀer and the rest more than
one job oﬀer. Acemoglu and Shimer (2000) extend their finding and show that workers
who sample only one job oﬀer free-ride on workers who sample two job oﬀers. This
externality implies that in equilibrium there are too few workers sampling two job
oﬀers. Noisy search models (see also Burdett and Judd, 1983) assume that a worker
incurs a fixed cost and receives several job oﬀers with corresponding wages. The job
oﬀers are randomly distributed, where the distribution mechanism is assumed to be
exogenous. Lately, Gautier and Moraga-González (2004) endogenize this distribution
by allowing workers to make multiple applications. The job oﬀer distribution results
from the coordination failure between firms, since they do not know which worker was
x PREFACE
already contacted by a competing firm.
The Diamond paradox can also be overcome if workers are assumed to observe
wage oﬀers before they start to apply for a job. Models based on that assumption
are called directed search models or competitive search models. This literature started
with Montgomery (1991), Moen (1997), and Acemoglu and Shimer (1999). The fact
that wages are publicly observable does not imply that workers are paid their marginal
product or that wages are unique. The reason is that the coordination failure among
workers implies that several workers can apply for the same job. If a firm oﬀers a high
wage, then the likelihood is high that it attracts many workers. At the same time
each single worker has a low probability of getting the job. In addition firms cannot
expand the demand for labor without bounds, since they face some cost for opening
a vacancy, which implies that matching frictions prevail. The exact probability of
being matched depends on the formulation of the matching function (see below). In
equilibrium workers might be indiﬀerent between joining a long queue at a job oﬀering
a high wage or applying for a job oﬀering a low wage, where the probability of getting
that job is high. Regardless of whether multiple equilibria and wage dispersion exist
or not, the fact that wages are publicly observable implies that firms oﬀer a wage that
maximizes the workers life-time utility. Since firms make zero profit, maximizing the
workers’ utility is equivalent to maximizing social welfare.
Burdett and Mortensen (1998) kept the assumption of sequential search but in-
troduced on-the-job search. This also implies competition between firms, because a
potential future employer has to oﬀer a higher wage than the worker is currently earn-
ing in order to poach him. The model is able to explain the firm-size wage eﬀect,
since firms oﬀering a high wage have a high steady-state labor force. The underlying
intuition is that a firm oﬀering high wages attracts more workers from firms oﬀering
lower wages and loses fewer workers to employers paying higher wages. Firms are,
however, indiﬀerent between oﬀering a low or a high wage, since a high wage leads not
only to a large firm but also implies a low profit per worker. The reverse is true for
firms paying a low wage. Thus, the model generates a continuous wage distribution.
Unfortunately, the predicted wage oﬀer distribution has an increasing convex density
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which is not compatible with the data.
In order to generate a more realistically shaped wage distribution, researchers ex-
tended the simple model by Burdett and Mortensen (1998). Mortensen (1990) and Bur-
dett and Mortensen (1998) combine their simple model with atomless ex-ante worker
heterogeneity as in the model of Albrecht and Axell (1984). This does, however, gen-
erally not generate a right tailed wage distribution. Mortensen (1990) introduced
diﬀerences in firm productivity and showed that more productive employers pay higher
wages. Bontemps, Robin and van den Berg (2000) and Burdett and Mortensen (1998)
formulate a closed form solution for a continuous productivity distribution. While the
structural estimates of the models with continuous productivity dispersion as suggested
by Bontemps, Robin and van den Berg (2000) and Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) im-
prove the fit to the empirical wage earnings distribution, they tell us nothing about
the production parameters governing the assumed productivity dispersion.
Burdett and Mortensen (1998) assume a constant oﬀer arrival rate, because they
concentrate on the steady state wage structure and abstract from productivity or other
shocks aﬀecting the labor market tightness over the business cycle. As Mortensen
(2000) shows the restriction to a constant Poisson arrival rate of oﬀers can be relaxed
to allow for a general matching function.
Content of the dissertation
The extension of the Burdett-Mortensen model presented in chapter 1 allows for a
flexible production function that incorporates and links diﬀerent skill groups. Comple-
mentarity between diﬀerent skill groups in the production process is shown to generate
a positive intra-firm wage correlation across diﬀerent skill groups, a result backed by
empirical findings by Barth and Dale-Olsen (2003). The flexibility of the production
function allows for decreasing and increasing returns to scale, where the later can gener-
ate a unimodal wage distribution with a long right tail without any ex-ante productivity
dispersion.
The extension in chapter 1, therefore, provides a method of estimating the produc-
tion parameters governing the productivity dispersion that generates a unimodal wage
distribution. Holzner and Launov (2005) fit the wage distribution for low, medium and
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high skilled workers in Germany and find that increasing returns to scale estimates fit
the wage distribution quite well.
In chapter 2 I focus on the asymmetric information that exists between the current
employer and the outside market regarding a worker’s productivity. The model shows
that for severe enough search frictions, a market for employed workers with wage gains
emerges despite the presence of adverse selection. Asymmetric information about a
worker’s productivity between the worker’s current employer and the outside market
enables the current employer to keep its best employees from joining the outside mar-
ket by promoting them or by making them counter oﬀers. Since outside wage oﬀers
are uncertain, firms promote or make counter oﬀers only to their best workers. The
resulting adverse selection, though, leads to an initial breakdown of the market for
employed workers. As low-productivity workers are laid oﬀ over time, tenure serves as
a positive signal about a worker’s productivity. After enough badly performing workers
were laid oﬀ, the signal is strong enough to counteract the negative eﬀect of adverse
selection and a market for employed workers emerges.
Within this framework it is possible to explain several empirical findings about the
job mobility and wage dynamics of young workers. The model presented in chapter
2 can explain that movers outperform stayers in the short run but in the long run
the on average higher productivity of stayers implies that they earn more in the long
run. The model also explains that the hazard of job termination increases initially
but is decreasing in the long run. The learning aspect dealt with in chapter 2 is
related to Jovanovic (1979, 1984) and leads for the same reasons to a wage tenure
eﬀect. Jovanovic, however, analyzes a framework where workers and their employers
learn about the productivity of a match, which implies that there is no asymmetric
information between the current employer and the outside market about the worker’s
productivity. In chapter 2 it is also shown that a market for employed workers paying
higher wages than the current employer might not exist. One reason for non-existence
could be that a high matching rate for employed workers induces current employers
to promote their best workers in order to prevent them from starting to search. The
resulting adverse selection can lead to a breakdown of the market.
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In chapter 3 I use a general matching function to model the frictions in the labor
market and assume, as first done by Pissarides (1979), that firms open vacancies as long
as the value of a vacancy is positive. This drives the profits of opening a new position
down to zero. The fact that firms’ profits are driven down by vacancy creation is central
to the result in chapter 3 that search frictions per se do not imply that firms invest
ineﬃciently in general training. The zero profit condition resulting from the creation
of vacancies implies that future employers of trained workers do not profit from the
training in other firms. This allows the training firm and its trainee to enter into a
long-term contract that guarantees that the training level will be eﬃcient if workers
are not credit constrained.
Chapter 3 also shows that it is more expensive for firms to hire high skilled workers
than low skilled workers, which provides an incentive for firms to provide some training
for unskilled workers. In addition firms want to reduce turnover of the newly trained
worker and promote workers as soon as possible to take away their incentive to search
for an outside job. Thus, training firms demand a lump-sum payment equivalent to the
value of the promotion from workers that are not credit constrained and promote them
immediately. Credit constrained workers are paid a trainee wage of zero and promoted
only with some probability making them indiﬀerent between staying unskilled and
being trained. Only if labour mobility is very high and workers are credit constrained,
then workers will gain from training.

Chapter 1
The Role of Skill Groups and the
Production Function for the Shape
of the Wage Distribution
This chapter extends the Burdett-Mortensen model of on-the-job search by
introducing diﬀerent skill groups and links them via a general production
function. Depending on the degree of homogeneity of the production func-
tion the model generates a log-normal-shaped wage earnings distribution.
The extended model provides a method of estimating technological substi-
tution elasticities between the diﬀerent skill groups and of estimating the
returns to education taking skill specific unemployment into account.
1
2 CHAPTER 1.
1.1 Introduction
It is generally believed that the shape of the wage earnings distribution is determined
by the skill distribution of the work force, the production technology employed by
the economy, the search and matching frictions that govern the allocation of workers
to jobs and by institutions like a legally bounded minimum wage. The aim of this
chapter is to provide a theoretical and yet empirically tractable model that takes all
these factors and its interactions into account. In order to do so I extend the on-
the-job search equilibrium model by Burdett and Mortensen (1998) since this model
generates an explicit functional form for the wage oﬀer and earnings distribution, which
allows to estimate the parameters that influence the wage distribution. I extend it by
introducing diﬀerent skill groups and link them via a general production function with
constant or increasing returns to scale. The extension to diﬀerent skill groups allows
for the analysis of firms’ wage posting behavior, where firms simultaneously compete
for workers of diﬀerent skill groups. It is shown that supermodularity in production
implies a positive correlation between the wages of workers in diﬀerent skill groups
within firms. The extension to a production function with increasing returns to scale
can generate a unimodal wage oﬀer and earnings distributions with a long right tail
and provides a method of deriving the technological substitution elasticities between
skill groups from the wage earnings distribution.
The original Burdett-Mortensen model introduces on-the-job search into the search
literature and is thus able to generate a wage oﬀer distribution. The reason for the
existence of a wage distribution is that firms oﬀering higher wages attracted more
workers from firms oﬀering lower wages and lose less workers to employers paying
higher wages. This leads to a higher steady-state labor force for firms oﬀering higher
wages. In equilibrium firms are indiﬀerent between paying low or high wages since high
wages imply not only a large labor force but also a low profit per worker. The reverse
is true for firms oﬀering low wages.
Since the endogenous wage distribution generated by the original Burdett-Mortensen
model has an upward-sloping density, which is at odds with the empirical observation
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of a flat right tail, there has been a lot of eﬀort to extend the original model in order
to generate a more realistic-shaped wage distribution. Mortensen (1990) introduced
diﬀerences in firm productivity and Bowlus et al. (1995) showed that this greatly im-
proves the fit to the empirical wage distribution. Bontemps et al. (2000) and Burdett
and Mortensen (1998) formulated a closed-form solution for a continuous atomless pro-
ductivity distribution, which translates into a right-tailed wage earnings distribution,
depending on the assumed productivity dispersion. A model with endogenous employer
heterogeneity is given by Mortensen (2000) who shows that wage dispersion gives rise to
diﬀerent investment incentives for employers such that higher-paying employers invest
more in match-specific capital.
This extension is the first one to allow for the possibility that the production func-
tion incorporates several skill groups and exhibits increasing returns to scale, which
can generate a log-normal shaped wage oﬀer and earnings density given one production
technology. While the structural estimates of the models with continuous productivity
dispersion as suggested by Bontemps et al. (2000) and Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002)
improve the fit to the empirical wage earnings distribution and thus the estimates of
the labor market transition rates, they tell us nothing about the production parame-
ters governing the assumed productivity dispersion — a critique already mentioned by
Manning (2003, p. 106f).
The advantage of having one or few production technologies is to enable empirical
researchers to derive structural estimates of the production technology from the wage
earnings distribution and the data on durations of employment or unemployment.1 So
far the literature has derived technology parameters from estimates of labor demand
functions (for a summary of the literature see Hamermesh, 1996). This literature
assumed a competitive labor market with (or without) adjustment costs. Thus, firms
react to current or expected changes in relative input prices and output by adjusting
their labor force accordingly. Manning (2003) and Barth and Dale-Olsen (2002) found,
1I also allow for employer heterogeneity, i.e. that diﬀerent technologies are used by
diﬀerent firms, in order to make the model more attractable for empirical research (see
Holzner and Launov, 2005).
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however, that firms face a locally upward sloping labor supply curve which gives them
the monopsony power to set wages. Thus, firms are able to adjust their labor force
by either oﬀering higher or lower wages. If this is the case, then the estimates of
production parameters in the traditional studies should be biased.
Holzner and Launov (2005) show that the extension of the Burdett-Mortensen
model to three skill groups and three Cobb-Douglas production technologies fits the
data quite well. They use panel data of German full-time, male workers to estimate
the values of being a new market entrant as low and high skilled workers.
Finally, I demonstrate in this chapter that whenever skills are complementary in the
production process, a positive within-firm correlation between wages of workers with
diﬀerent skills exists. Positive wage correlation within firms is a well established fact,
empirical evidence of which are presented in Katz and Summers (1989) and Barth and
Dale-Olsen (2003) among many others. Theoretical consideration of the issue is per-
formed by Kremer (1993). In his O-ring theory Kremer also uses a production function
that exhibits complementarity of the working colleagues’ abilities not to make a mistake
when performing a sequence of tasks in order to complete the final good. Exploiting
this property, Kremer shows that firms recruit equal ability types for each task. Since
higher ability types are more productive, they are paid higher wages in a competitive
market. Thus wage diﬀerentials in the O-ring theory are attributable to workers’ abil-
ity, whereas wage diﬀerentials in this chapter are explained by the monopsony power
of firms to set wages. The O-ring theory also suggests that wages increase with the
number of tasks performed in a firm, since only high ability workers are able to produce
goods that require many tasks. Thus, the O-ring theory implies a positive correlation
between wages and the number of tasks and therefore the overall size of the workforce,
whereas this model predicts a positive correlation between skill-group size and wages.
However, Barth and Dale-Olsen (2002) find empirically that the employer-size wage
eﬀect vanishes once they look at the skill-group size. This provides some evidence in
favor of the labor market frictions approach of this model rather then O-ring theory of
Kremer (1993).
This chapter proceeds as follows. The theory is presented in Section 2, where
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I extend the existing Burdett-Mortensen framework, solve for optimal strategies of
workers and firms and define the labor market equilibrium. The discussion of the
properties of the resulting equilibrium wage oﬀer distribution is treated in Section
3. Section 4 presents the results of Holzner and Launov (2005) who take this theoretical
model to the data. Section 5 concludes.
1.2 The Model
In this section I extend the original Burdett-Mortensen model of on-the-job search by
introducing diﬀerent skill groups and diﬀerent technologies that link the skill groups
via the production function.
Framework
The model has an infinite horizon, is set in continuous time and concentrates on steady
states. Workers are assumed to be risk neutral and to discount at rate r. Each worker
belongs to a skill group i = 1, 2, ..., I whose measures are defined as qi, satisfyingP
qi = m. The measure ui of workers is unemployed and the measure qi−ui is employed.
Before choosing a skill-group workers incur a one-oﬀ cost ci for skill-specific education.
By assuming perfect capital market workers are able to borrow the cost of education.
Workers search for a job in the skill-segmented labor markets. With probability λi
unemployed workers of skill group i encounter a firm that makes them a wage oﬀer
corresponding to their education, and with probability λe employed workers encounter a
firm.2 Then workers decide whether to accept or reject the job oﬀer. Job-worker match
is destroyed at an exogenous rate δ > 0. Laid oﬀ workers start again as unemployed.
I assume that there exist J distinct production technologies Yj (l (w | wr, F (w)))
indexed by j, where l (w | wr, F (w)) is the vector of skill groups li (w | wri , Fi (w))
employed by a firm with technology j. The size li (w | wri , Fi (w)) of the skill group
depends on the firm’s wage oﬀer wi, the workers’ reservation wage wri and the skill
specific wage oﬀer distribution Fi(w). I further assume that the production function
2λe is not skill group specific, since we would otherwise not be able to derive an explicit wage oﬀer
distribution function.
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Yj (l (w | wr, F (w))) is supermodular in l (w | wr, F (w)), i.e. has increasing diﬀer-
ences in l (w | wr, F (w)) as defined below, and is twice continuously diﬀerentiable in
li (w | wri , Fi (w)).
Definition 1: For any l ≡ l (w | wr, F (w)) and l0≡ l0 (w | wr, F (w)), Yj (l) is super-
modular in l, if
Yj (l∧l0) + Yj (l∨l0) ≥ Yj (l) + Yj (l0) ,
where l∨l0 ≡ (max (l1, l01) , ...,max (lI , l0I)) and l∧l0 ≡ (min (l1, l01) , ...,min (lI , l0I)).
Supermodularity in li implies increasing diﬀerences in li, i.e. for l ≥ l0 it follows that
Yj (li, l−i) + Yj
¡
l0i, l
0
−i
¢
≥ Yj
¡
li, l
0
−i
¢
+ Yj (l
0
i, l−i) ,
where −i denotes the vector of all skill groups except i.
Firms maximize profits by oﬀering a wage schedule w = (w1, w2, ..., wI)= (wi,w−i).
Workers’ Search Strategy
The optimal search strategy for a worker of occupation i is characterized by a reserva-
tion wage wri , where an unemployed worker is indiﬀerent between accepting or rejecting
a wage oﬀer, i.e. Ui = Vi(wri ), where Ui is the value of being unemployed and Vi(w
r
i ) the
value of being employed at the reservation wage wri . Flow values of being unemployed
and employed
rUi = λi
Z w¯i
wri
(Vi(xi)− Ui) dFi(xi)− ci, (1.1a)
rVi(wi) = wi + λe
Z w¯i
wi
(Vi(xi)− Vi(wi)) dFi(xi) + δ (Ui − Vi(wi))− ci (1.1b)
respectively, can be solved for a reservation wage3
wri = (λi − λe)
w¯iZ
wri
µ
1− Fi(x)
r + δ + λe(1− Fi(x−))
¶
dx. (1.2)
In order to keep the analysis simple, for the remainder of the paper I assume that
r/λi → 0 as done in the original model by Burdett and Mortensen (1998). The wage
3The details of the derivation can be found in Mortensen and Neumann (1988).
1.2. THE MODEL 7
oﬀer distribution is given by Fi(w) = Fi(w−) + υi(w), where υi(w) is the mass of firms
oﬀering wage w to skill group i. Since oﬀering a wage lower than the reservation wage
does not attract any worker, I assume with out loss of generality that no firm oﬀers a
wage below the reservation wage, i.e. Fi (w) = 0 for w < wri .
Steady State Flows and Skill Group Size
Equating the flows in and out of unemployment gives the steady state measure of
unemployed per skill group, i.e.
ui =
δ
δ + λi
qi. (1.3)
Given the assumptions of constant Poisson arrival rates λi, λe and the constant sepa-
ration rate δ Mortensen (1999) has shown that skill group size evolves according to a
special Markov-chain known as stochastic birth-death process.
The birth rate of a job oﬀered by a firm posting a wage w is given by the average
rate at which a job is filled. There are ui unemployed who leave unemployment at rate
λi and (qi−ui) employed workers who leave their current employer at rate λeGi(w−) to
join the firm oﬀering a wage w, where Gi(w) = Gi(w−)+ϑi(w) denotes the cumulative
wage earnings distribution for skill group i. A worker-employer pair split at rate δ or
a worker receives a higher wage oﬀer from another firm, which occurs at rate λe, and
accepts it, which happens with probability F i(w) ≡ (1− Fi(w)). The death rate of a
job is, therefore, given by δ + λeF i(w). Mortensen (1999) shows that the skill group
size is Poisson distributed with mean
E [li (w | wri , Fi (w))] =
λiui + λeGi(w−)(qi − ui)
δ + λeF i(w)
.
Equating the inflow and outflow gives the steady-state measure of employed workers
earning a wage less than w
Gi(w−)(qi − ui) =
λiFi(w−)ui
δ + λeF i(w−)
. (1.4)
Substituting gives
E [li (w | wri , Fi (w))] =
δλi (δ + λe) / (δ + λi)£
δ + λeF i(w)
¤ £
δ + λeF i(w−)
¤qi, (1.5)
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From (1.5) it follows that the expected skill group size E [li (w | wri , Fi (w))] is (i) in-
creasing in w, if w ≥ wri , (ii) continuous except where Fi (w) has a mass point and is (iii)
strictly increasing on the support of Fi (w) and constant on any connected interval oﬀ
the support of Fi (w). The intuition behind this result is that on-the-job search implies
that the higher the wage oﬀered by a firm the more employed workers are attracted
from firms oﬀering lower wages and the less workers quit to employers paying higher
wages. This leads to a higher steady-state skill group size for firms oﬀering higher
wages. For notational simplicity from now on I use li (w) instead of li (w | wri , Fi (w)).
Wage Posting
Each firm posts a wage schedule w in order to maximize its profit, taking as given the
workers’ search strategy, i.e. the reservation wage vector wr, and the other firms’ wage
posting behavior, i.e. F (w).
πj = max
w
E
£
Yj (l (w))−wT l (w)
¤
.
The expectation operator in the equation above is over all possible realizations of the
diﬀerent skill group sizes li (w | wri , Fi (w)) a firm can realize given its choice of the
wage schedule and the birth-death process characterized above. Hence, in the steady
state a firm might choose to adjust its wage policy according to the realizations of the
diﬀerent skill group sizes li (w | wri , Fi (w)). Since this problem is intractable, I assume
that a firm can specify its wage policy w only once. This implies that I can write the
maximization problem of a type j firm as
πj = max
w
£
Yj (E [l (w)])−wTE [l (w)]
¤
. (1.6)
Denote by Wj the set of wage oﬀers that maximize equation (1.6), i.e. Wj =
argmax
w
πj, and the corresponding I-dimensional wage oﬀer distribution for each firm
type j by Fj (w) = (F1j(w), F2j(w), ..., FIj(w)), where Fij(w) denotes the wage oﬀer
distribution of type j firms for skill group i.
Definition 2: A steady state wage posting equilibrium is a wage oﬀer distribution
1.3. PROPERTIES OF THE WAGE OFFER DISTRIBUTION 9
Fj (w) with w ∈Wj for each firm type j ∈ J such that
πj = Yj (E [l (w)])−wTE [l (w)] for all w on the support of Fj (w) , (1.7)
πj ≥ Yj (E [l (w)])−wTE [l (w)] otherwise,
given the reservation wage wri for each skill group i = 1, 2, ..., I and a corresponding
skill group wage oﬀer distribution Fi (w) such that the reservation wage wri satisfies
equation (1.2) given Fi (w).
1.3 Properties of the Wage Oﬀer Distribution
Following Mortensen (1990) I next describe the properties of the aggregate and the
skill specific wage oﬀer distributions.
Given the supermodularity property of the production function and the fact that
the expected skill group size given in equation (1.5) is increasing in w and upper semi-
continuous implies that profits πj are supermodular in wi. Thus, a firm paying higher
wages for one skill group also pays higher wages for another skill group.
Proposition 1: Take a firm of type j ∈ [1, J ] oﬀering w ∈ Wj and another firm of
type j oﬀering w0 ∈Wj, where w and w0 ≥ wr, then either w ≥ w0 or w ≤ w0.
Proof: For any w and w0 ≥ wr, πj (wi,w−i) is supermodular, i.e.
πj
¡
wi∧w0i,w−i∧w0−i
¢
+ πj
¡
wi∨w0i,w−i∨w0−i
¢
≥ πj (wi,w−i) + πj
¡
w0i,w
0
−i
¢
,
because the same inequality holds for output Yj (E [l (wi,w−i)]) and the wage cost
cancel out.
Now, I prove w ≥ w0 by contradiction. For any w and w0∈Wj with wi > w0i, suppose
w−i < w0−i. The following chain of inequalities results in the desired contradiction.
0 < πj (wi,w−i)− πj
¡
wi∨w0i,w−i∨w0−i
¢
≤ πj
¡
wi∧w0i,w−i∧w0−i
¢
− πj
¡
w0i,w
0
−i
¢
< 0
The first and the last inequality result from optimality of w and w0, the second in-
equality comes from the supermodularity shown above. ¤
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This positive correlation between the wages of workers in diﬀerent skill groups
within firms is a well established fact. Katz and Summers (1989) show evidence that
secretaries earn more in firms where average wages are higher. More recently, Barth
and Dale-Olsen (2003) find that ”[h]igh-wage establishments for workers with higher
education are high-wage establishments for workers with lower education as well”. The
explanation provided for this empirical observation in this paper rests on two pillars.
Firstly, labor market frictions lead to an upward sloping labor supply curve for each skill
group which can be seen from equation (1.5). Secondly, I need the complementarity of
the skill groups in the production process. This guarantees that increasing both labor
inputs simultaneously is optimal. The empirical regularity mentioned above justifies
my choice of the production function, where labor inputs are complements.
Note, that Proposition 1 does not guarantee that a firm occupies the same position
in the wage oﬀer distribution of all skill groups, because it is possible that there is
a mass point in the wage oﬀer distribution of skill group i but not in the wage oﬀer
distribution in the other −i skill groups.
Given that the skill group size is increasing in the wage wi, it would be a waist of
money, if the support of the wage oﬀer distributions was not a compact set.
Lemma 1: The support of each skill specific wage oﬀer distribution Fi (w) is a compact
set, i.e. supp(Fi) = [wri , wi].
Proof: Suppose not, i.e. no firms oﬀer a wage wi ∈ (w∗i , w∗∗i ) ⊂ [wri , wi]. This cannot
be profit maximizing, since the firm oﬀering w∗∗i can oﬀer limε→0 (w
∗
i + ε), have the
same skill group size, i.e. li (w∗∗i | wri , Fi (w∗∗i )) = limε→0 li ((w∗i + ε) | wri , Fi (w∗i + ε)),
since limε→0 Fi (w∗i + ε) = Fi (w
∗∗
i ), and can thus make higher profit. Thus, the support
of the wage oﬀer distribution is connected. By the same argument wri is part of the
support. The equal profit condition (1.7) together with the equation for the skill group
size (1.5) implies that the support is also closed at the upper end. ¤
Firms with diﬀerent technologies j make potentially diﬀerent profits πj in equilibrium,
compare equation (1.7). I index the technologies according to their profitability, i.e.
πj ≥ πj−1∀j = 1, 2, ..., J . The next proposition shows that for any skill group i more
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profitable firms pay higher wages.
Proposition 2: Let Fj : supp(Fj) =
£
wj,wj
¤
and Fj−1 : supp(Fj−1) =
£
wj−1,wj−1
¤
be the I-dimensional wage oﬀer distributions of j and j − 1-type firms respectively.
Then, for any wage schedule wj ∈ [wr,w] and wj−1 ∈ [wr,w] it is true that wj ≥ wj−1.
Proof: From the steady state equilibrium condition (1.7) it follows that:
πj = Yj (E [l (wj)])−wTj E [l (wj)] ∀wj ∈ supp(Fj)
πj ≥ Yj (E [l (wj−1)])−wTj−1E [l (wj−1)] ∀wj−1 /∈ supp(Fj)
Using the result above I can write
πj = Yj(E [l (wj)])−wTj E [l (wj)] ≥ Yj(E [l (wj−1)])−wTj−1E [l (wj−1)]
≥ Yj−1(E [l (wj−1)])−wTj−1E [l (wj−1)] = πj−1 ≥ Yj−1(E [l (wj)])−wTj E [l (wj)] ,
where the second inequality results from the fact that πj ≥ πj−1.
The diﬀerence of the first and the last terms in this inequality is greater than
or equal to the diﬀerence of its middle terms, i.e Yj(E [l (wj)]) − Yj−1(E [l (wj)]) ≥
Yj(E [l (wj−1)])− Yj−1(E [l (wj−1)]). Since l (w) is an increasing function of wages w,
the claim follows. ¤
In order to be able to identify a particular technology in the empirical estimation, I
assume that technologies strictly dominate each other by profits, i.e. πj > πj−1. Since
Proposition 2 holds true for any wage pair wj,wj−1 and thus also for wj = infwj and
wj−1 = supwj−1, it follows that wj ≥ wj−1. Thus, the more productive firms with
technology j pay higher wages for all skill groups.
Furthermore, let γj denote the cumulative measure of technology j with γj > γj−1 >
0 ∀j = 1, 2, ..., J and γJ = 1. Thus, Proposition 3 implies that the fraction of firms
with technologies earning profit πj or less post wages wj or below. Thus, for every
skill group i the wage oﬀer distribution at wijis given by γj, i.e.
Fi (wij) = γj (1.8)
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The next proposition shows under which condition it is not optimal for a type j firm
to oﬀer the same wage wi as a mass of other type j firms does.
Proposition 3: The wage oﬀer distributions Fi (wi) of type j firms for skill group i
is continuous, if
Yj [E [li (wi | wri , Fi (wi))] , E [l (w−i)]]− Yj
£
E
£
li
¡
wi | wri , Fi
¡
w−i
¢¢¤
, E [l (w−i)]
¤
> wij
¡
E [li (wi | wri , Fi (wi))]−E
£
li
¡
wi | wri , Fi
¡
w−i
¢¢¤¢
. (1.9)
If a mass point exists, then it can only exist at the upper bound of the support of Fi (wi),
i.e. Fi
¡
w−i
¢
= γj − υi (wij).
If the marginal product at the upper bound of the support of Fi (wi) exceeds wij, then
mass points can be ruled out, i.e.
∂Yj [E [l (w)]]
∂E
£
li
¡
wij | wri , γj
¢¤ > wij. (1.10)
Proof: uppose a mass point exists at wi ∈
£
wij, wij
¤
. Equation (1.6), and the fact
that the cdf Fi(wi) is right continuous implies
lim
ε→0
πj (wi + ε,w−i) +w
T
−iE [l (w−i)]
= Yj [E [li (wi | wri , Fi (wi))] , E [l (w−i)]]− wiE [li (wi | wri , Fi (wi))] (1.11)
> Yj
£
E
£
li
¡
wi | wri , Fi
¡
w−i
¢¢¤
, E [l (w−i)]
¤
− wiE
£
li
¡
wi | wri , Fi
¡
w−i
¢¢¤
= πj (w) +wT−iE [l (w−i)]
since Fi(wi)− Fi(w−i ) = υi(wi) > 0. If the above inequality holds, when a mass point
exists at wi.
To show that mass points can only exist at the upper bound of the support of Fi (wi)
note that equation (1.5) together with Proposition 2 implies that E [li (wi | wri , Fi (wi))]
is strictly increasing in wi on its support
£
wij, wij
¤
, i.e. ∆E [li (wi | wri , Fi (wi))] /∆wi >
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0. Using the equal profit condition (1.7) implies
∆E [li (wi)]
∆wi
=
E [li (wi)]
Yj [E [li (wi)] , E [l (w−i)]]− Yj
£
E
£
li
¡
w−i
¢¤
, E [l (w−i)]
¤
− wi
¡
E [li (wi)]−E
£
li
¡
w−i
¢¤¢ ,
where E
£
li
¡
w−i
¢¤
= E
£
li
¡
wi | wri , Fi
¡
w−i
¢¢¤
. This expression is only positive if and
only if inequality (1.11) holds, i.e. only if no mass point exists. Thus, a mass point
cannot exist in the interior of the support of Fi (wi) but only at the upper bound, i.e.
Fi
¡
w−i
¢
= γj − υi (wij).
Rewriting inequality (1.11) and using the fact that Fi
¡
w−i
¢
= γj − υi (wij) gives
Yj [E [li (wi)] , E [l (w−i)]]− Yj
£
E
£
li
¡
w−i
¢¤
, E [l (w−i)]
¤
E [li (wi)]−E
£
li
¡
w−i
¢¤ > wij.
A necessary condition for no mass point to exist obtains by letting υi (wij)→ 0, i.e.
lim
υi(wij)→0
Yj [E [li (wi)] , E [l (w−i)]]− Yj
£
E
£
li
¡
w−i
¢¤
, E [l (w−i)]
¤
E [li (wi)]−E
£
li
¡
w−i
¢¤ = ∂Yj [E [l (w)]]
∂E
£
li
¡
wij | wri , γj
¢¤ .
¤
The basic argument as to why the wage oﬀer distributions can be continuous is given
by Burdett and Mortensen (1998). If all firms oﬀer the same wage for one skill group,
then individual firms could attract a significantly larger expected skill group size by
oﬀering a slightly higher wage. This wage increase can be arbitrarily small, whereas
the resulting increase in the skill group size is significant, since all workers currently
working for the “mass-point” wage will change to the new employer as soon as they
get this higher wage oﬀer. The deviation from a mass point is, thus, profitable if the
increase in total output is higher than the increase in total wage cost induced by a
slight wage increase. This is stated by the condition (1.9) in Proposition 4.
In order to be able to derive an explicit solution for the wage oﬀer distribution, I
continue under assumption that no mass points exist. If all wage oﬀer distributions
are continuous, then an immediate result of Proposition 1 is that a firm occupies the
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same position in the wage oﬀer distribution of every skill group. To formalize this let
us introduce an index k, which orders the firms of type j as they increase their wage
oﬀer for skill group 1 (i.e. firm k = 1 oﬀers w1j), then Proposition 1 implies that for
all w ∈Wj
F kij (w) = F
k
lj (w) for all i, l = 1, 2, ..., I. (1.12)
In order to be able to us the above property I introduce the following separation of a
skill group size, where I rewrite the skill group size as
E [li (w | wri , Fi (w))] = rijhj (w) ,
where
hj (w) =
£
δ + λe
¡
1− γj−1
¢¤2£
δ + λeF j (w)
¤ £
δ + λeF j (w−)
¤ , rij = δ (δ + λe)λi/ (δ + λi)£
δ + λe
¡
1− γj−1
¢¤2 qi.
The fact that hj (w) depends only on the position the firm takes in the wage oﬀer distri-
bution, i.e. Fj (w), implies that hj (w) does not depend on any skill specific parameter.
Since I want to derive an explicit functional form for the wage oﬀer distribution for
each skill group i I additionally have to approximate the production technology j by
using a second order Taylor Expansion around the minimum wage wij that firms with
technology j post. Given a technology Yj (rj) is homogeneous of degree ξj the Taylor
Expansion is given by
Yj (l (wj)) = Yj (rj) +
X
i
Y 0j (rj) [rijhj (w)− rij] +
1
2
X
i
σij [hj (w)− 1]2 ,
where
Y 0j (rj) =
∂Yj (rj)
∂li
and σij =
X
l
∂2Yj (rj)
∂li∂ll
rljrij =
¡
ξj − 1
¢
Y 0j (rj) rij.
Using the results of Propositions 1-3 I invoke the equal profit condition πj = πrj and
apply the Taylor Expansion and the first order condition to derive the skill-specific
wage oﬀer distribution. Proposition 4 provides the solution for Fi(wi) as a function of
wi.
Proposition 4: Given that production functions Yj (E [l (w)]) ∀j = 1, 2, ..., J are su-
permodular and given that no mass point exists, then a unique equilibrium wage oﬀer
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distribution Fij(wi) for each skill group i = 1, 2, ..., I exists that has the following form
(i) for ξj = 1
Fij(wi) =
δ + λe
λe
−
δ + λe(1− γj−1)
λe
s
Y 0j (rj)− wi
Y 0j (rj)− wij
, (1.13)
(ii) for ξj 6= 1
Fij(wi) =
δ + λe
λe
(1.14)
−
δ + λe
¡
1− γj−1
¢
λe
s
(Y 0j (rj)−wi)rij−σij−
q
((Y 0j (rj)−wi)rij−σij)
2
+4(σij−µij)((Y 0j (rj)−wij)rij−µij)
−2(σij−µij)
for any wi ∈ [wij, wij], where
µij =
rijP
i rij
1
2
X
i
σij,
A necessary condition for an upward sloping wage oﬀer density fij(wi) is¡
2− ξj
¢ ∂Yj (rj)
∂rij
− wi > 0. (1.15)
Proof: See Appendix. ¤
The aggregate wage oﬀer distribution is given by
F (w) =
IX
i=1
qi
m
Fi(wi) =
IX
i=1
qi
m
JX
j=1
¡
γj − γj−1
¢
Fij(wi).
A special case for Fij(wi) when
¡
Y 0j (rj)− wij
¢
rij = µij is shown in the proof of Propo-
sition 5. Since it implies artificial restrictions on ξj considering this case here is neither
interesting nor useful.
For a production function with homogeneity of degree one the explicit wage oﬀer dis-
tribution resembles the distribution derived in Burdett and Mortensen (1998) and has
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its typical increasing density. Since an upward-sloping earnings density is at odds with
the empirical observation of a flat right tail, Mortensen (1990) introduces diﬀerences
in firm productivity by allowing for diﬀerent productivity levels in order to improve
the fit to the empirical wage earnings distribution. Bowlus et al. (1995) demonstrate
that this greatly improves the fit to the empirical earnings distribution. Bontemps et
al. (2000) and Burdett and Mortensen (1998) formulate a closed-form solution for a
continuous atomless productivity distribution, which translates into a right-tailed wage
earnings distribution, depending on the assumed productivity dispersion.4
The novelty is that the wage oﬀer distribution given in Proposition 5 can have
an increasing and a decreasing density for a given production technology. Although I
allow for the possibility that heterogeneous production technologies are used, I do not
need any technology dispersion to get a hump-shaped density. As stated in condition
(1.15) only technologies with homogeneity of degree 2 > ξj can have an increasing
density. Notice further that as the wage w increases condition (1.15) is more likely to
be violated implying that the wage oﬀer density can have an upward sloping part for
small wages and an downward sloping part for large wages. A production technology
with decreasing returns to scale would result in a negative wage oﬀer density for at
least one skill group, hence violate the first order condition and result in a violation of
the continuity condition.
The reason for why increasing returns to scale can bend the wage oﬀer density in
such a way that is depicts a long right tail has its cause in the equal profit condition. Let
us focus on the case with a homogenous production function with increasing returns
to scale and compare it to an economy with constant returns to scale, where the
marginal product of firms oﬀering the reservation wage schedule are equivalent in both
environments. First note that the skill group size is determined solely by the firm’s
position in the wage oﬀer distribution. Thus, the shape of the wage oﬀer distribution
does not matter for the output generated. Due to increasing returns to scale the output
of firms at the top of the wage oﬀer distribution increases more than compared to an
4However, tail behavior of the productivity density, hence oﬀer and earnings densities, in this case
is subject to additional restrictions (see Bontemps et al., 2000; Proposition 8).
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economy with constant returns to scale. In order for firms on the top of the wage
oﬀer distribution to make the same profits as firms at the lower end, the firms in an
environment with increasing returns to scale have to pay higher wage in order to satisfy
the equal profit condition as compared to firms in an environment with constant returns
to scale who are at the same position of the wage oﬀer distribution (except of course
the firm oﬀering the reservation wage schedule). Thus, the wage oﬀer distribution in
an economy with increasing returns to scale is more dispersed. If the returns to scale
are large enough, the wage diﬀerence paid by “neighboring” firms at the upper end of
the wage oﬀer distribution increases generating a decreasing wage oﬀer density.
Mortensen (2000) makes implicitly a similar restriction to production functions
with increasing returns to scale when deriving endogenously the employer heterogene-
ity based on match specific capital. He assumes that the production technology has
constant returns with respect to labor but on increasing economies of scale due to the
capital k employed by the firm, i.e. Y (l (w)) = kαl (w). By simulation he shows that
for positive α the wage oﬀer distribution has a flat right tail.
Finally, the comparative statics results of the original Burdett-Mortensen model
are still valid for the general wage oﬀer distribution function. If the arrival rate of on-
the-job oﬀers, i.e. λe, goes to zero, then the wage oﬀer distribution Fi(w) collapses to
a mass point at the reservation wage wri , which equals the Diamond (1971) monopsony
solution. If moving from one job to another becomes very easy, i.e. λe goes to infinity,
the competition among firms drives wages up and the wage earnings distribution Gi(w)
converges to a mass point at the marginal product of the skill group.
1.4 Empirical Evidence
Holzner and Launov (2005) use monthly data on duration and wages for full-time, male
workers from the German Socio-Economic Panel — a longitudinal survey of German
households — and estimate the model using three distinct Cobb-Douglas production
function with low, medium and high skilled workers. The first remarkable result is that
unconstrained estimates of the increasing returns specification meets the no-mass-point
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condition derived in Proposition 3, indicating that the estimates are consistent with
the model.
The constant returns to scale specification has two jumps at the left tail and eight
spikes at the right, however the locally increasing right tail of individual-specific den-
sities renders the fit of the aggregate earnings density far from satisfactory. Relaxing
the assumption of constant returns improves the picture (see figure 2). The predicted
wage oﬀer density is shown in figure 1.
Along with frictional parameters they also estimate the size of the returns to
scale. According to their estimates the homogeneity degrees are 1.04 for the “low-
productive” technology, 1.40 for the “medium-productive” technology and 4.92 for the
“high-productive” one. Given the estimated fraction of each technology
£
γj − γj−1
¤
in
the economy these estimates imply the economy-wide returns to scale at the level of
1.20. This goes in line with numerous evidences from the literature on the estimation
of the returns to scale using diﬀerent types of production functions. Typical estimates
in this literature support the increasing returns hypothesis and range from about 1.1
to about 1.35 (see Färe at al., 1985, Kim, 1992, and Zellner and Ryu, 1998, and
references therein). Second, and even more important, productivity dispersion along
with increasing returns technologies also leads to a better fitting oﬀer and labour costs
densities.
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Source: Holzner and Launov (2005), Figure A4 and A5.
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1.5 Conclusion
This chapter extends the on-the-job search equilibriummodel by Burdett andMortensen
(1998) by introducing diﬀerent skill groups and linking them via a production func-
tion which allows for constant and increasing returns to scale. Whenever skills are
complementary in the production process, a positive within-firm correlation between
wages of workers with diﬀerent skills arises. Depending on the degree of homogeneity
of the production function the extension is able to generate a unimodal wage oﬀer and
earnings distributions with a long right tail given one production technology.
Many empirical researchers have estimated on-the-job search models assuming a
continuous productivity dispersion across firms. Although these models fit the data
very well, they provide no insight into the technology generating the continuous dis-
tribution. The focus on only few production technologies that are flexible enough to
fit the data as suggested in this model enables empirical researchers to estimate the
structural parameters underpinning the production dispersion. This extension also al-
lows one to estimate the returns to education taking skill specific unemployment into
account and to calculate the cost for acquiring additional skill.
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1.6 Appendix: Proof of Proposition 4
Define
hj (w) =
£
δ + λe
¡
1− γj−1
¢¤2£
δ + λeF j (w)
¤2 , rij = δλi (δ + λe)
(δ + λi)
£
δ + λe
¡
1− γj−1
¢¤2 qi
Y 0j (rj) =
∂Yj (rj)
∂li
, and σij =
X
l
∂2Yj (rj)
∂li∂ll
rljrij.
The second order Taylor-Expansion of the production function around rj is given by
Yj (l (wj)) = Yj (rj) +
X
i
Y 0j (rj) [rijhj (w)− rij] +
1
2
X
i
σij [hj (w)− 1]2 .
Note, that hj (w) is independent of the skill group i, because of equation (1.12). Using
the equal profit condition for the equilibrium, i.e. πj (wj) = πj
¡
wj
¢
, and substituting
gives
D =
X
i
¡
Y 0j (rj)− wi
¢
rijhj (w) +
1
2
X
i
σij (hj (w)− 1)2 (A.1)
−
X
i
¡
Y 0j (rj)− wij
¢
rij = 0
The first order condition for wage wi satisfies,µ
∂Yj (l (w))
∂li (wi)
− wi
¶
li (wi) = li (wi)
2
∙
dli (wi)
dwi
¸−1
, (A.2)
where rhs can be written as
li (wi)
2
∙
dli (wi)
dwi
¸−1
= [rijhj (w)]
2
∙
rij
dhj (w)
dwi
¸−1
According to the result that all firms occupy the same position in all wage oﬀer dis-
tribution, changing the wage for one skill group implies a change of all other wages in
the same direction, i.e. according to equation (A.1)
[rijhj (w)]
2
∙
rij
dhj (w)
dwi
¸−1
= rijhj (w)
2
µ
−∂D/∂hj (w)
−
P
i ∂D/∂wi
¶
=
rijP
i rij
³X
i
¡
Y 0j (rj)− wi
¢
rijhj (w) +
X
i
σij
¡
hj (w)
2 − hj (w)
¢´
.
Using a Taylor-Expansion for the first derivative of the production function and sub-
stituting ll (wl) out gives
Y 0j (l (w)) = Y
0
j (rj) +
X
l
∂2Yj (rj)
∂li∂ll
(rljhj (w)− rlj) .
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The first order condition can therefore be written as¡
Y 0j (rj)− wi
¢
rijhj (w) + σij
¡
hj (w)
2 − hj (w)
¢
=
rijP
i rij
³X
i
¡
Y 0j (rj)− wi
¢
rijhj (w) +
X
i
σij
¡
hj (w)
2 − hj (w)
¢´
.
Substituting
P
i
¡
Y 0j (rj)− wi
¢
rijhj (w) from equation (A.1) gives¡
Y 0j (rj)− wi
¢
rijhj (w) + σij
¡
hj (w)
2 − hj (w)
¢
=
rijP
i rij
X
i
¡
Y 0j (rj)− wij
¢
rij +
rijP
i rij
1
2
X
i
σij
£
hj (w)
2 − 1
¤
.
Evaluating this equation at wij and substituting
rijP
i rij
P
i
¡
Y 0j (rj)− wij
¢
rij gives¡
Y 0j (rj)− wi
¢
rijhj (w) + σij
¡
hj (w)
2 − hj (w)
¢
=
¡
Y 0j (rj)− wij
¢
rij +
rijP
i rij
1
2
X
i
σij
£
hj (w)
2 − 1
¤
.
Rearranging gives¡
σij − µij
¢
hj (w)
2 +
¡¡
Y 0j (rj)− wi
¢
rij − σij
¢
hj (w) =
¡
Y 0j (rj)− wij
¢
rij − µij, (A.3)
where µij =
rijP
i rij
1
2
P
i σij.
For a production function with homogeneity of degree one σij = 0 for all i I get
Fij(wi) =
δ + λe
λe
−
δ + λe(1− γj−1)
λe
s
Y 0j (rj)− wi
Y 0j (rj)− wij
.
Apart from this a special cases appear if
¡
Y 0j (rj)− wij
¢
rij −µij = 0. In this case I get
Fij(wi) =
δ + λe
λe
−
δ + λe(1− γj−1)
λe
s¡
Y 0j (rj)− wij
¢
rij − σij¡
Y 0j (rj)− w
¢
rij − σij
.
Otherwise, I get the following solution for the quadratic function, i.e.
hj (w) = −
¡
Y 0j (rj)− wi
¢
rij − σij
2
¡
σij − µij
¢
±
q¡¡
Y 0j (rj)− wi
¢
rij − σij
¢2
+ 4
¡
σij − µij
¢ ¡¡
Y 0j (rj)− wij
¢
rij − µij
¢
2
¡
σij − µij
¢ . (A.4)
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The wage oﬀer density implied by the quadratic function (A.3) has to be positive, i.e.
dFij(w)
dwi
= − −rijhj (w)¡
2
¡
σij − µij
¢
hj (w) +
¡¡
Y 0j (rj)− wi
¢
rij − σij
¢¢ ∂hj(w)
∂Fij(w)
> 0
Since ∂hj(w)∂Fij(w) > 0, it follows that 2
¡
σij − µij
¢
hj (w) +
¡¡
Y 0j (rj)− wi
¢
rij − σij
¢
has to
be greater than zero. Rewriting equation (A.4) implies that only the positive solution
is valid, i.e.
+
q¡¡
Y 0j (rj)− wi
¢
rij − σij
¢2
+ 4
¡
σij − µij
¢ ¡¡
Y 0j (rj)− wij
¢
rij − µij
¢
= 2
¡
σij − µij
¢
hj (w) +
¡
Y 0j (rj)− wi
¢
rij − σij > 0. (A.5)
Hence the cumulative wage oﬀer distribution is given by
Fij(wi) =
δ + λe
λe
−
δ + λe
¡
1− γj−1
¢
λe
s
(Y 0j (rj)−wi)rij−σij−
q
((Y 0j (rj)−wi)rij−σij)
2
+4(σij−µij)((Y 0j (rj)−wij)rij−µij)
−2(σij−µij)
.
In order to see that the wage oﬀer density can be increasing and decreasing consider
the explicit solution to the wage oﬀer density
fij(wi) =
(δ+λe(1−γj−1))rij
2λe
q
((Y 0j (rj)−wi)rij−σij)
2
+4(σij−µij)((Y 0j (rj)−wij)rij−µij)
× 1s
(Y 0j (rj)−wi)rij−σij−
q
((Y 0j (rj)−wi)rij−σij)
2
+4(σij−µij)((Y 0j (rj)−wij)rij−µij)
−2(σij−µij)
.
The slope of the wage oﬀer density is given by
∂fij(w)
∂w
= −((Y
0
j (rj)−wi)rij−σij)
2
+4(σij−µij)((Y 0j (rj)−wij)rij−µij)−2rij((Y 0j (rj)−wi)rij−σij)
((Y 0j (rj)−wi)rij−σij)
2
+4(σij−µij)((Y 0j (rj)−wij)rij−µij)
×
(δ+λe(1−γj−1))r2ij
4λe
q
((Y 0j (rj)−wi)rij−σij)
2
+4(σij−µij)((Y 0j (rj)−wij)rij−µij)s
(Y 0j (rj)−wi)rij−σij−
q
((Y 0j (rj)−wi)rij−σij)
2
+4(σij−µij)((Y 0j (rj)−wij)rij−µij)
−2(σij−µij)
Thus, a necessary condition for the wage oﬀer density to be upward sloping is that¡
Y 0j (rj)− wi
¢
rij − σij > 0. Substituting σij, and using the Euler Theorem gives the
stated condition.

Chapter 2
On-the-Job Search and Asymmetric
Information in the Labor Market
This chapter focuses on the asymmetric information that exists between the
current employer and the outside market regarding a worker’s productiv-
ity. The model shows that for severe enough search frictions, a market for
employed workers with wage gains emerges despite the presence of adverse
selection. Asymmetric information about a worker’s productivity between
the worker’s current employer and the outside market enables the current
employer to keep its best employees from joining the outside market by
promoting them or by making them counter oﬀers. Since outside wage of-
fers are uncertain, firms promote or make counter oﬀers only to their best
workers. The resulting adverse selection, though, leads to an initial break-
down of the market for employed workers. As low-productivity workers are
laid oﬀ over time, tenure serves as a positive signal about a worker’s pro-
ductivity. After enough badly performing workers were laid oﬀ, the signal
is strong enough to counteract the negative eﬀect of adverse selection and
a market for employed workers emerges.
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2.1 Introduction
This chapter considers the implications the interaction of asymmetric information and
search have on lay-oﬀ and promotion decisions and on the corresponding wage dynam-
ics. As the worker’s productivity is revealed to the current employer and the worker
over time the information advantage of the current employer compared to the outside
market increases. The outside market makes non-observable job oﬀers to employed
workers in order to prevent their current employers from using their information to
make counter oﬀers. The current employer tries to exploit this information advantage
by promoting his best performing workers in order to prevent them from searching. At
the same time the outside market tries to separate well performing workers from their
“average” productive colleagues by inducing them to search in diﬀerent markets.
I present a learning model with asymmetric information in a labor market where
search frictions are the same for all firms and where workers are passive agents. This
basic model can already explain several empirical findings about the job mobility of
young workers, the wage tenure eﬀect, and about the wage gains and wage losses of
“stayers” and “movers” over time. While part of these findings are already explained by
other models, the model presented in this chapter provides an explanation for several
common features of the labor market.
The model explains an empirical finding by Farber (1994), namely that the hazard
rate of job termination increases up to a maximum and declines thereafter. The expla-
nation given in this chapter is as follows. Initially, the probability is zero, because the
cost of recruitment implies that a firm will wait some time before laying oﬀ a worker.
During that time tenure will not carry any information about a worker’s productivity,
implying that the market for employed workers is likely to break down. The hazard
becomes positive as the first workers are laid oﬀ. After the first layoﬀs, a market with
wage increases for employed workers need not resume immediately, since it takes some
time to ensure that enough badly performing workers are laid oﬀ such that the pool of
searching workers has a suﬃciently high productivity to enable outside firms to oﬀer
wages above the worker’s current wage. At some point the hazard declines, because
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promoted workers quit at a lower rate and more and more workers are promoted over
time. In addition the likelihood that an employed worker is revealed to be of a bad type
and hence is laid oﬀ declines over time. This is similar to Jovanovic (1979) who shows
in a model with symmetric information where match-specific productivity is revealed
to the worker and the firm over time. He shows that the hazard can increase in the
first periods and declines thereafter. Pissarides (1994) explains in an on-the-job model
with firm-specific human capital a declining hazard.
As mentioned above the best-performing workers might be promoted by their cur-
rent employer in order to prevent them from searching or quitting. Thus, for high
productivity workers the option to get an outside wage oﬀer is enough to induce their
current firm to increase their wage. The consequent promotion of the best-performing
workers then implies together with the assumed downward wage rigidity that wages
increase with tenure. Jovanovic (1979) already showed that the revelation of match-
specific productivity over time can lead to a wage-tenure eﬀect. Since in his model
wages adjust to the expected productivity at the match, bad matches, which imply
decreasing wages, are terminated voluntarily while good matches, which imply wage
increases, persist. Even if identical workers search on-the-job it is optimal for the cur-
rent employer to increase wages over tenure in order to reduce the worker’s quit rate,
as shown by Burdett and Coles (2003). In the model presented here both mechanisms
are at work to generate a wage-tenure eﬀect.
While the explanation based on the theory of firm-specific human capital devel-
oped by Becker (1993) and Hashimoto (1981) — where a worker and a firm share
the investment and the returns on the investment into firm-specific human capital to
reduce turnover — is seen by many empirical researchers as the key source for why
wages increase with tenure, there are also empirical studies by Abraham and Farber
(1987), Altonji and Shakotko (1987) and more recently Altonji and Williams (1997)
supporting the explanation given by Jovanovic and in this paper based on the revela-
tion of productivity over time. They show that the measured positive cross-sectional
return to seniority found in studies of Mincer and Jovanovic (1981) and Bartel and
Borjas (1981) among others is largely a statistical artifact due to the correlation of
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high seniority with an omitted variable representing the quality of the worker, job or
worker-employer match.
On-the-job search as in Burdett and Mortensen (1998) explains that wages increase
with experience since workers search for better paying jobs while being employed.
On-the-job search models also predict wage cuts for workers that are laid oﬀ. Such
wage cuts are also explained by the adverse selection models of Greenwald (1986)
and Gibbons and Katz (1991) among others. The predicted wage dynamics following
a layoﬀ are diﬀerent, however. The on-the-job search models predict a closing wage
diﬀerence between laid oﬀ workers and employed workers, since individuals are identical
and unemployment is seen as a random shock that will in the long-run aﬀect everybody
equally. The adverse selection models predict a persisting wage gap since stayers are
more productive than movers. Combining adverse selection with on-the-job search
implies a declining wage gap with some persistent diﬀerence in the long-run.
Furthermore, I provide conditions under which it is optimal for the current employer
to ignore outside oﬀers. This is important because the early on-the-job search models by
Burdett (1978), Jovanovic (1984), Pissarides (1994) and Burdett and Mortensen (1998)
assume that the current employer does not react to outside wage oﬀers. Thus, workers
receiving higher outside wage oﬀers climb up the wage ladder. Postel-Vinay and Robin
(2002) assume the opposite, namely that the current employer observes and reacts to
an outside wage oﬀer by making a counter oﬀer. The resulting Bertand competition
between firms drives the wage up so that the firm with the highest productivity wins
the bidding game. Although it is quite obvious that making a counter oﬀer is optimal
if outside wage oﬀers are observable, it turns out that if outside wage oﬀers are not
observable, it is optimal not to make counter oﬀers only if search frictions are large
enough.
The outline of this chapter is as follows. The next section I presents the framework
of the model. In section 3 I analyze the learning model with asymmetric information
and derive the results on the job mobility of young workers, the wage tenure correlation
and about the wage gains and wage losses of stayers and movers over time.
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2.2 The Framework
Driving forces in this model are three core assumptions. Firstly, I assume that an
outside wage oﬀer is not observed by the worker’s current employer until it is accepted.
This assumption is most easily justified by the fact that it is in the interest of outside
firms to conceal their outside oﬀers, since making an observable outside wage oﬀer
would trigger a counter oﬀer of the current employer and lead to a breakdown of the
on-the-job market in an economy with homogenous employers.1
The second core assumption is that wages cannot be negotiated downward.2 If wages
could be negotiated downward, then nobody would be laid oﬀ and tenure could not
be used as a positive production signal. Adverse selection caused by the promotion
strategy of the current firm then implies that only a market for the least productive
workers exists.
Thirdly, I assume that outside firms can condition their wage oﬀers on the em-
ployment status of a worker and on the periods t an applicant has been employed for.
This is necessary in order for tenure to serve as a signal about productivity.3 I further
assume that future employers know the tenure at the previous employer.
1Lazear (1986) and Waldman (1990) present a model where learing takes place in a
diﬀuse fashion, i.e. not only the current employer but also the raiding firm learns with
some probability the worker’s type. Both authors show that outside firms only make
an observable wage oﬀer, if it is informed about the worker’s type. Since in the model
presented here, the current employer is always better informed about the worker’s type
than the outside market, the assumption that outside oﬀers are not observable by the
current employer is without loss of generality.
2A good literature review justifying downward wage rigidity is given in Weiss (1991)
and Bewley (1999).
3The idea that the firm’s retention decision serves as a signal about a worker’s
productivity goes back to Waldman (1990) and Gibbons and Katz (1991). Waldman’s
model about up-or-out contracts analyses the incentives to invest in human capital in a
model where the current and the outside firm learn about a worker’s ability in a diﬀuse
fashion. Gibbons and Katz focus in their two period model on the wage diﬀerential of
workers that are laid oﬀ compared to those displaced.
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The model is set in discrete time and has an infinite horizon. A measure n of new
market entrants enter the labor market every period and each worker survives with
some probability until the next period. The analysis focuses on one cohort. Workers
diﬀer in the probability p to produce output of unit 1, where the distribution of types is
given by a cumulative distribution function F (p) with support p ∈
£
p, p
¤
. This chapter
focuses on the asymmetric information which exists between the current employer and
the outside market regarding a worker’s productivity. There is symmetric information
between the worker and the current employer about the worker’s productivity. Workers
are, however, better informed than their second employers. In the basic model I,
therefore, concentrate on what happens during a worker’s first job and assume that
new market entrants have the same prior belief about their type as their first employers
have.
The prior belief about a worker’s expected productivity equals the average produc-
tion probability of all new market entrants, i.e.
b0 =
Z
pdF (p) . (2.1)
The beliefs are updated by Bayes’ rule. The worker’s and his first employer’s belief
about the worker’s productivity is, therefore, given by
byt = b
y(ht,s)
t =
R
py(ht,s)+1 (1− p)t−y(ht,s) dF (p)R
py(ht,s) (1− p)t−y(ht,s) dF (p)
, (2.2)
where y (ht,s) denotes the aggregate output of a worker with working history ht,s at
tenure t and last employment status s ∈ {u, e}, where u stands for unemployed and
e for employed workers. The subscript s is used as long as it is unknown whether
unemployed and employed workers are searching in the same or in separate markets.
The development of the expected productivity byt is shown in figure 1, where firms will
update their belief at every t after production has taken place between t− 1 and t.
2.2. THE FRAMEWORK 31
bty
t
0 54321 6
w0
b0
Figure 1: Development of the expected productivity byt .
The outside market does not observe the aggregate output of a worker y (ht,s). Outside
firms only observe the tenure t of a worker, whether a worker is unemployed or employed
and in which market he is currently searching or the firm he works for. Let Hmt,s be
the set of working histories ht,s of workers with the last labor market status s who are
believed to search in market m ∈ M , where M denotes the set of existing markets at
tenure t. The believed market productivity µmt,s is therefore given by
µmt,s =
X
ht,s∈Hmt,s
R
py(ht,s)+1 (1− p)t−y(ht,s) dF (p)P
ht,s∈Hmt,s
R
py(ht,s) (1− p)t−y(ht,s) dF (p)
. (2.3)
The second employer’s belief about a worker recruited from a market with average
productivity µmt,s is also updated by Bayes’ rule. After a worker produced aggregate
output x in d periods the second employer’s belief about his productivity is given by
bxd|m =
X
ht,s∈Hmt,s
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
Z
py(ht,s)+x+1 (1− p)t−y(ht,s)+d−x dF (p)Z
py(ht,s)+x (1− p)t−y(ht,s)+d−x dF (p)
×
R
py(ht,s) (1− p)t−y(ht,s) dF (p)P
ht,s∈Hmt,s
R
py(ht,s) (1− p)t−y(ht,s) dF (p)
⎞
⎠ .
I assume that searching workers receive a wage oﬀer with the given probability
(1− s) ∈ (0, 1) and that firms pay a fixed costR to recruit a worker. In order to simplify
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the worker’s decision problem, I assume that workers are myopic. Since workers are
myopic they need not be insured against future layoﬀs, i.e. it is optimal for firms to
write one period contracts. Furthermore, the myopic behavior of workers rules out that
workers with the same observable characteristics but diﬀerent unobserved productivity
might be induced to search in separate markets since workers accept a higher wage
regardless of the future risk of being laid oﬀ.
Firms exist forever and discount future payments with a factor β ∈ (0, 1), which
includes the exit probability of a worker. Free entry of firms ensures that firms make
zero profit, i.e. Π
¡
wmt,s|µmt,s
¢
the expected value of employing a worker with believed
market productivity µmt,s and last labor market status s at the market wage w
m
t,s equals
the recruitment cost R, i.e.
Π
¡
wmt,s|µmt,s
¢
= R. (2.4)
The value of employing a worker with believed productivity byt is given by his expected
productivity byt minus his current wage wt plus the expected discounted continuation
payoﬀ βEt
£
Π
¡
wt|byt+1
¢¤
, i.e.
Π (wt|byt ) = max
"
max
wt∈[wt−1,∞)
£
byt − wt + βEt
£
Π
¡
wt|byt+1
¢¤¤
, 0
#
(2.5)
By the assumption of downward wage rigidity, the firm can not lower wages, i.e. pay
wt ∈ [wt−1,∞). It can, of course, lay oﬀ a worker. Clearly,
Π (wt|byt ) is strictly increasing in per period profit byt − wt.
To ensure that the worst performing workers will eventually be laid oﬀ, I assume that
the productivity of a new market entrant minus the cost of recruiting him exceeds the
productivity of the least productive workers, i.e.
b0 −R > p, (2.6)
Let me now turn to the game between the worker and his current firm after each
production period.
Step 1: A firm decides whether or not to lay oﬀ a worker. The firm cannot recall a
laid-oﬀ worker.
2.2. THE FRAMEWORK 33
Step 2: If a worker was not laid oﬀ, the current firm decides whether or not to promote
him and whether to prolong the contract.
Step 3: Outside firms observe the labor market status (unemployed versus employed)
and the tenure of all searching workers. Given that information they decide on
the wage oﬀers wmt,s for those laid oﬀ and for those still employed. The promotion
decision is assumed not to be observable.
Step 4: Workers observe all wage oﬀers. Since search is costless, I assume that workers
start to search only if a market wage oﬀerwmt,s exceeding his current wagewt exists.
If more such outside wage oﬀer exists, workers decide in which market m ∈ M
to search in.
Step 5: Matched firms of marketm decide whether to employ a matched worker given
his observed characteristics.
Before solving the game, it seems useful to comment on the assumptions about the
information that is transmitted from the current employer’s actions to the market and
compare them to the assumptions underlying other adverse selection models.
In Greenwald’s (1986) model of “Adverse selection in the labour market” workers
move either because of an exogenous reason or because the current employer induces the
worker to quit by oﬀering them a lower wage than the market wage. Gibbons and Katz
(1991) show that this is only a corner equilibrium of a continuum of equilibria, because
the current employers can use other layoﬀ rules, e.g. laying oﬀ the worst workers and
inducing the rest of the workers it want to get rid oﬀ to quit. Since the current employer
is indiﬀerent between laying oﬀ workers or inducing them to leave, it depends on the
equilibrium belief of all firms which layoﬀ policy is implemented. In both models the
retention decision is a positive signal about the workers’ productivity either in the same
period as in Gibbons and Katz or one period later as in the Greenwald.
Promotion is assumed not to be observable by the outside market, thus promotion
should rather be seen as a pay increase not as an assignment to a diﬀerent task. If I
assumed contrary the current employers have to worry that this positive signal enables
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outside firms to raid their best workers as it is common in assignment models (see
Waldman, 1984, or Ricart i Costa, 1988). The assignment literature assumes that jobs
diﬀer in productivity such that more able workers are more productive in the assigned
job. If the jobs do not diﬀer in productivity, then the assignment literature has shown
that nobody should be promoted.
2.3 The Model
The stage game is solved by backward induction:
Step 5: Matched firms employ a matched worker, if the expected profit is positive, i.e.
µmt,s − wmt,s + βEt
£
Π
¡
wmt,s|µmt,s
¢¤
≥ 0.
This is always the case as long as µmt,s ≥ wmt,s, since µmt,s ≥ wmt,s =⇒ Et
£
Π
¡
wmt,s|µmt,s
¢¤
≥ 0.
Step 4: Since workers are myopic, they search if and only if the market wage exceeds
the current wage, i.e.
wmt,s > wt, (2.7)
where wt ∈ [wt−1,∞).
Step 3: Outside firms observe the labor market status s and the tenure t of all workers
and form a belief about the workers’ productivity µmt,s of workers searching in market
m. For the laid oﬀ workers the market wage is given by
wmt,s = µ
m
t,s + βEt
£
Π
¡
wmt,s|µmt,s
¢¤
−R,
For employed workers the corresponding market belief — as given in equation (2.3) —
has to exceed the initial belief, i.e. µmt,s > b0, in order for outside firms to be able to
oﬀer a market wage wmt,s that satisfies the free entry condition and exceeds the initial
wage, i.e.
wmt,s = µ
m
t,s + βEt
£
Π
¡
wmt,s|µmt,s
¢¤
−R > w0, (2.8)
where bx1 |m denotes the second employer’s belief after the worker stayed with him one
period.
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Step 2: Given that the current firm’s belief about the average productivity of workers
searching is µmt,s, it promotes, i.e. pays a worker wt = w
m
t,s, where w
m
t,s is given by
equation (2.8) if and only if the payoﬀ of the promoted worker is higher than the
payoﬀ of paying him the last period’s wage wt−1 and taking into account that he will
get and accept an outside oﬀer with probability 1− s, i.e. stay with probability s,
byt − wmt,s + βEt
£
Π
¡
wmt,s|byt+1
¢¤
> s
¡
byt − wt−1 + βEt
£
Π
¡
wt−1|byt+1
¢¤¢
. (2.9)
The promotion-threshold productivity bp, if a worker earned wage wt−1 last period and
the market oﬀers a wage wmt,s, is given by
bp − wmt,s + βEt
£
Π
¡
wmt,s|bp
¢¤
= s
¡
bp − wt−1 + βEt [Π (wt−1|bp)]
¢
. (2.10)
Promotion can lead to adverse selection and multiple equilibria on the market for
employed workers, since the very best workers are promoted and kept oﬀ the labor
market, whereas the average productive workers are not promoted and therefore search.
Step 1: Finally, the least productive workers are laid oﬀ, if and only if their expected
current payoﬀ plus their continuation payoﬀ is negative. The timing of the game implies
that a worker is not promoted and laid oﬀ at the same time, hence the layoﬀ decision
is based on the wage of the last period wt−1, i.e.
byt − wt−1 + βEt
£
Π
¡
wt−1|byt+1
¢¤
< 0. (2.11)
The layoﬀ-threshold belief bl (wt−1), given the worker earned wage wt−1 last period,
is defined such that the worker’s believed productivity makes the current firm just
indiﬀerent between continuing to employ this worker or laying him oﬀ and searching
for a new worker, which has a value of zero. Given that the continuation payoﬀ at the
threshold is zero, i.e. Et
£
Π
¡
wt−1|bl (wt−1)
¢¤
= 0, if follows that,
bl (wt−1) = wt−1. (2.12)
As shown in figure 2 depending on the current employer’s belief about the worker’s
productivity byt the worker will either be laid oﬀ if his expected productivity is below
the last period’s wage, he will be promoted if his productivity is high enough, i.e.
36 CHAPTER 2.
byt > b
p, or he will start searching if he is not promoted and a market oﬀering a wage
higher than his last periods wage exists.
bl(w5) = w5
_
p
Worker is
promoted.
Worker is
laid off.
b6y
p
Worker starts
searching,
if w6m > w5.
bpb0
y = 0
y = 1
y = 2
y = 3
y = 4
y = 5
y = 6
Figure 2: Action taken by the current employer
or the worker depending on by6.
The core of the forthcoming analysis will be to look at the development of the distrib-
ution of the workers’ believed productivities (shaded columns) and the layoﬀ and the
promotion thresholds as time unfolds. At t = 0 all new market entrants have a believed
productivity of b0 and the mass is concentrated at b0. The situation depicted in figure
2 corresponds to t = 6 since workers’ aggregate output y ranges from zero up to six
units and so there are seven mass points corresponding to the current firm’s belief by6.
The next step will be to look under which condition an outside market with wage
increases exists and how workers’ mobility and wages develop over time. Consider first
the following lemmas.
Lemma 1: Employed workers do not search and outside firms are inactive as long as
nobody is laid oﬀ.
Proof: If nobody has been laid oﬀ so far, then the belief about the employed workers’
productivity equals the initial belief b0. A potential market wage oﬀer wmt,s could
therefore be no higher than the initial wage w0. Since due to the downward wage
rigidity the employed workers earn at least their initial wage, they would not start to
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search for an outside job, i.e. Hmt,s is empty. Thus, outside firms are inactive as long as
nobody is laid oﬀ. ¤
A direct consequence of Lemma 1 is that the current employer will not promote
anyone as long as no market exists, since workers have no other option as to stay with
their current employer as long as no market exists. An immediate, testable prediction
following from Lemma 1 is that newly recruited workers should not be promoted as
long as nobody from their cohort is laid oﬀ.
Note further that even if I assumed that some workers quit because of exogenous
reasons as is frequently done in the adverse selection literature in order to ensure that
an on-the-job market exists (see Greenwald, 1986, Gibbons and Katz, 1991 or Acemoglu
and Pischke, 1998 among others), a market with a wage higher than the initial wage
would not exist as long as nobody is laid oﬀ. The reason is that badly performing
workers cannot be induced to quit by oﬀering them a lower than the current wage
as done by Greenwald or Gibbons and Katz, since I assumed that wages cannot be
negotiated downward.
Lemma 2: From some point 0 < τ < ∞ onward, badly performing workers are laid
oﬀ.
Proof: Lemma 1 implies that the layoﬀ decision at τ is based on the initial wage w0.
The recruitment cost R implies that there is an option value for the current employer
to wait before laying oﬀ a worker, i.e. the free entry condition (2.4) and equation (2.12)
imply b0 > bl (w0) which gives 0 < τ .
b0 −R > p and the free entry condition (2.4) imply w0 − βE0 [Π (b1, w0)] > p. Substi-
tuting the initial wage w0 using equation (2.12) implies bl (w0) > p.
Furthermore, there are some unlucky workers who never produce. The believed pro-
ductivity of these workers approaches p as t→∞ , i.e. lim
t→∞
b0t → p. Given bl (w0) > p,
it follows that as t→∞ a point in time τ <∞ exists where b0τ < bl (w0). ¤
After the first workers have been laid oﬀ, the average productivity of the workers still
employed is higher than the average productivity of the new market entrant. Tenure is,
thus, a positive signal about a worker’s productivity. Since outside firms can observe a
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worker’s tenure and employment status, they can use these as a positive signal about
a worker’s productivity.
Outside firms can, however, not forbid unemployed workers to apply for the same
jobs as employed workers do. They can only enforce separation of workers with diﬀerent
characteristics, i.e. diﬀerent labor market status s and diﬀerent tenure t, if they can
commit to turn down a matched worker who does not posses the right characteristics.
Lemma 3:
(i) Unemployed workers will not search in a market oﬀering a wage wmt,e ≥ w0.
(ii) Employed workers of one cohort cannot be separated.
Proof:
(i) According to the layoﬀ decision (2.11) a worker is not employed if his value of
being employed is negative. For unemployed workers this is the case if and only if the
market oﬀers a wage wmt,e ≥ w0, since byt < bl (w0). With no chance of being employed
in a market oﬀering a wage wmt,e ≥ w0 unemployed will not search in that market.
(ii) Employed workers of one cohort cannot be separated since they are indistinguish-
able for outside firms and accept higher wages regardless of their believed productivity.
¤
Lemma 3 implies that after the first workers have been laid oﬀ outside firms oﬀering
a wage above the initial wage can be sure that the average productivity of the workers
searching in that market is above the layoﬀ-threshold belief, since oﬀering a wage higher
than the initial wage induces unemployed and employed workers to search in separate
markets. The second property of Lemma 3 implies that employed workers search in a
common market. Thus, for employed workers of one cohort only one market can exist.
Lemma 3 does, however, not guarantee that an on-the-job market with wage in-
creases emerges, since outside firms know that not all employed workers necessarily
search, since the best workers might have been promoted by the current employer in
order to keep them away from the market. Looking at the promotion condition (2.9)
reveals that the believed productivity of the searching employed workers µmt,e exceeds
the initial productivity b0, if the probability s of staying is large enough. This is stated
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in the following proposition characterizing the equilibrium.
Proposition 1:
(i) At all t < τ all workers earn w0, they do not search on-the-job, current employers
do not promote and outside firms are inactive.
(ii) At all t > τ workers with an expected productivity below their current wage byt < wt
are laid oﬀ,
a) if s > s =
¡
p− wmτ,e
¢
/ (p− w0), all workers with byt ≥ wt search on-the-job, current
employers do not promote and outside firms oﬀer wmτ,e > w0 according to equation
(2.8),
b) if s < s either (i) holds or workers with bp > byt ≥ wt search on-the-job, current
employers promote workers with byt ≥ bp and outside firms oﬀer wmτ,e > wt according
to equation (2.8).
Proof: (i) Follows from Lemma 1.
(ii) a) Since all employers observe that some workers have been laid oﬀ at τ , they
believe that for employed workers Hmτ,e is such that µ
m
τ,e > b0 if nobody is promoted.
Given µmτ,e the outside wage oﬀer is according to equation (2.8) greater than the initial
wage, i.e. wmτ,e > w0. Form the promotion condition (2.9) it follows that nobody is
promoted if and only if
s [p− w0] > p− wmτ,e. (2.13)
Since wmτ,e > w0, there exists an s =
p−wmτ,e
p−w0 ∈ (0, 1) such that for all s > s nobody is
promoted.
b) Suppose for some staying probability s < s the outside wage oﬀer wmτ,e is such that
the best workers are promoted according to the promotion condition (2.9). If µmτ,e ≤ b0
then situation (i) holds, if µmτ,e > b0 outside firms oﬀer wages according to equation
(2.8) greater than the initial wage, i.e. wmτ,e > w0. For worker promoted at time tp the
current wage is given by wt = wmtp,e and the argument follows again (ii) b). ¤
The intuition behind Proposition 1 is simply that large search frictions decrease
the firm’s willingness to promote, because it is harder for non-promoted workers to get
an outside wage oﬀer. Thus, fewer high-performance workers are promoted and start
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to search. The fact that more high-performance workers search increases the average
productivity of the searching workers and enables outside firms to oﬀer a wage higher
than the initial wage.
On the other hand, a lower staying probability or equivalently lower search frictions
induce firms to promote highly productive workers in order to take away their incentive
to search for an outside job. This decreases the average productivity µmt,e of those
workers searching and subsequently the market wage wmt,e outside firms can oﬀer. A
lower market wage again implies that firms are willing to promote not only the highly
productive workers but also less productive workers. This adverse selection eﬀect might
cause the average productivity of searching workers to be so low, i.e. µmt,e ≤ b0, that no
on-the-job market with wage increases ever emerges.
The explanation for Farber’s (1994) finding — that the hazard of job termination
increases up to a maximum and declines thereafter — can be described as follows.
Initially, the hazard is zero, because the cost of recruitment implies that a firm will
wait some time before laying oﬀ a worker. During that time tenure will not carry
any information about a worker’s productivity, implying that the market for employed
workers breaks down. The hazard becomes positive as the first workers are laid oﬀ.
After the first layoﬀs, the market for employed workers generally does not resume
immediately, since it takes some time to ensure that enough badly performing workers
are laid oﬀ such that the pool of searching workers has a suﬃciently high productivity
to enable outside firms to oﬀer wages above the worker’s current wage. After some point
the hazard declines, not because the probability of finding a job declines, but because
fewer workers are searching because the probability to be promoted increases as the
outside wage oﬀers increase over time. In addition, the likelihood that an employed
worker is of the bad type and hence is laid oﬀ declines as well.
As mentioned above, the best-performing workers are promoted by their current em-
ployer in order to prevent them from searching or quitting. Thus, for high productivity
workers the option to get an outside wage oﬀer is enough to induce their current firm
to increase their wage. Furthermore, since more and more badly performing workers
are laid oﬀ over time, it follows that the productivity of the pool of employed work-
2.4. CONCLUSION 41
ers and of the pool of searching workers increases over time. With an increase in the
productivity of searching workers over time the outside wage oﬀer increases, too. The
subsequent promotion of the best-performing workers together with the assumption of
downward wage rigidity implies that wages increase with tenure.
Corollary 2: Wages weakly increase with tenure.
Greenwald (1986) emphasizes that adverse selection inhibits turnover since workers
that are induced to change jobs are marked to be part of the inferior group. This
statement is still true but has to be qualified, since only laid oﬀ workers are stigma-
tized. Turnover is, however, still inhibited since only a low turnover rate can prevent
the current employers from using their superior information to promote the best work-
ers. Greenwald also predicts that stayers outperform movers in the long-run since the
retention decision at t is a positive signal about the workers’ productivity one period
later. By the same argument the basic model implies that “stayers” outperform laid
oﬀ workers. At the same time voluntary “movers” outperform “stayers” in the short
run, since “stayers” are composed of the promoted workers who earn a wage equal to
the “movers” and of workers who are searching but are not matched and, therefore,
earn their current wage. Later on promoted workers might also start to search and
earn even higher wages such that the initial “stayers” eventually outperform the initial
“movers”.
2.4 Conclusion
The model explains several empirical findings about the job mobility of young workers,
the wage tenure eﬀect and about the wage gains and wage losses of stayers and movers
over time. The finding that the hazard of job termination increases up to a maximum
and declines thereafter is also consistent with the model.

Chapter 3
Credit Constraints, Promotion and
Firm Financed General Training
This chapter investigates firm-financed general training in a Pissarides match-
ing framework. It assumes that workers of diﬀerent skills search in skill-
segmented markets. It shows that it is more expensive for firms to hire
high skilled workers than low skilled workers, which provides an incentive
for firms to provide some training for unskilled workers. In addition firms
want to reduce turnover of the newly trained worker and promote workers
as soon as possible to take away their incentive to search for an outside
job. Thus, training firms demand a lump-sum payment equivalent to the
value of the promotion from workers that are not credit constrained and
promote them immediately. Credit constrained workers are paid a trainee
wage of zero and promoted only with some probability making them indif-
ferent between staying unskilled and being trained. Only if labour mobility
is very high and workers are credit constrained, then workers will gain from
training.
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3.1 Introduction
Becker (1993) shows that in a competitive labor market workers should pay for general
training since they receive the full return to training. In a search model with bargaining,
I show that search frictions per se do not necessarily cause underinvestment into general
training and thus confirm Becker’s result that investment into general training can be
eﬃcient if workers are not credit constrained. The underlying reason is that future
employers need not profit from the training in other firms, if their profits are driven
down to zero as positive profits trigger vacancy creation. Since future employers of
trained workers do not benefit from the training in other firms, the training firm and
the worker can, if workers are not credit constrained, enter into a long-term contract
that guarantees that the training level will be eﬃcient. The training firm will oﬀer a
contract that demands a lump-sum payment equivalent to the value of the promotion
from its trainee and promotes him immediately. Thus, the skilled worker will not search
and training will be eﬃcient. If workers are credit constrained firms want to reduce
turnover of the newly trained worker and promote them as soon as possible to take
away their incentive to search for an outside job. Credit constrained workers are paid a
trainee wage of zero and are promoted with some probability making them indiﬀerent
between staying unskilled and being trained.
If workers are credit constrained, then the training firm will still provide some train-
ing, because when deciding whether to train an unskilled worker or not, the firm faces
the trade oﬀ between training an unskilled worker at its own expense or recruiting a
skilled worker from the market. The diﬀerence in recruitment costs between unskilled
workers and skilled workers can be used to pay for the general training, a point al-
ready mentioned by Oatey (1970) and Stevens (1994, 2001). While Stevens (1994,
2001) assumed diﬀerent recruitment cost, the model presented here endogenizes the
recruitment cost.1
Even if workers are credit constrained, they need not benefit from training, because
when posting the trainee contract the training firm can set the trainee wage to zero
1Oatey (1970) presents no formal model.
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and commit to a promotion rate such that it takes away the trained worker’s expected
gain from searching for another job. Trainees gain from training only if workers are
credit constrained and the matching probability for a trained worker is high enough.
The model presented in this chapter follows the line of other research showing
that labor market frictions provide an incentive for firms to invest in general training.
Acemoglu and Pischke (1999) show that a compressed wage structure is suﬃcient for
firms to pay at least partly for general training and that credit constraints, which are
mentioned by Becker (1993) as a reason why firms may pay for general training, are
not necessary. This compressed wage structure may be the result of an information
asymmetry between training firms and not-training firms about the ability of individual
workers as Katz and Ziderman (1990), Chang and Wang (1996) and Acemoglu and
Pischke (1998) show. Acemoglu (1997) or Acemoglu and Pischke (1999) model firm
financed general training with search frictions. They find that firms can only extract
part of the return since future employer benefit from the training in other firms. Hence
they are not willing to finance general training up to the eﬃcient level. The contribution
of this paper is, that it shows that a promotion commitment can increase the training
firm’s return to training by reducing turnover. Thus, promotion can increase training
activities. A third strand of the literature explains general training in combination of
firm-specific training.
The plan of the chapter is as follows. Section 2 presents the framework. Section 3
derives the workers’ behavior followed by the analysis of labor turnover in the steady
state in Section 4. Section 5 derives the firms’ vacancy creation decision, the general
training condition in a situation where workers are credit constrained and where they
are not. Section 6 establishes that multiple labor market equilibria exist if workers are
credit constrained. Section 7 presents extensions concerning the wage formation. The
chapter concludes by summarizing the main results.
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3.2 The Framework
Firms
The model considers an infinite-horizon, stationary labor market in continuous time.
The measure of firms is normalized to unity. Firms are assumed to be risk neutral and
to discount future payments by the rate of interest r. All firms live infinitely. Firms
search for workers by creating vacancies vi for the respective labor markets, where
i ∈ {s, u}. s stands for the labor market of skilled workers and u for the labor market
of unskilled workers. The fact that workers of diﬀerent skill are assumed to search in
diﬀerent markets implies that firms opening a vacancy for one type of worker have no
use for another type of worker and can therefore commit not to employ a worker of
another type. The advertising cost for a vacancy per time unit is given by adt.
The bargaining wages wi for skilled and unskilled workers are taken as given by
the firm when it chooses the training γ and the promotion rate ρ. The firm oﬀers
with probability γdt an employed, unskilled workers a training contract specifying a
trainee-wage wt and the commitment by the firm to pay the education cost c. The
general training contract is a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer by the firm. The large number
of unskilled workers per firm implies that the firm has eﬀectively all market power
and can therefore oﬀer a contract that makes an unskilled worker exactly indiﬀerent
between accepting and rejecting the oﬀer.
Firms produce according to a constant return to scale production function. The
output produced over the period dt is given by an strictly increasing, concave and twice
continuously diﬀerentiable function
ydt = F (lu, ls + lt) dt.
Since training is instantaneous, trainees are able to work as skilled labor. Therefore,
the skilled labor force (ls + lt) is given by the sum of skilled workers and trainees. The
unskilled labor force is given by lu.
Firms promote trainees to a full skilled job with a respective market wage at rate
ρdt. Furthermore, I assume that the firm is able to commit to its promotion promise.
Workers
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New market entrants start their working career as unskilled workers, whose measure
is defined by m. If they are trained by the firm, they become skilled worker. Workers
are assumed to be risk neutral and to discount future payments at rate r. If workers
are credit constrained, they cannot make any payment to the firm. A worker’s stay in
the labor market is exponentially distributed with parameter δ > 0. If a worker exits
the labor market, he is replaced by a new individual.
All unskilled workers start searching as unemployed in the labor market for un-
skilled. During that period they receive unemployment income normalized to zero.
Individuals only search if the expected gain is strictly positive. Thus, only trained
workers that are not promoted start to search for a skilled job. The labor markets for
skilled and unskilled are separated. For simplicity, I assume that employed workers
cannot become unemployed. Employment ends with a positive probability per period
(here δdt) because of workers exiting the labor market.
Matching
Define si as the measure of workers searching in a particular labor market. The labor
market tightness is defined as the ratio of vacancies to searching workers, θi ≡ vi/si.
DefineM(vi, si) as a Pissarides-type matching function, whereM(0, si) =M(vi, 0) = 0.
It is assumed to be increasing, twice continuously diﬀerentiable, concave and linearly
homogeneous. It hence has constant returns to matching and can be written in terms
of the labor market tightness M(vi, si) ≡ siq(θi). The properties of M(vi, si) imply
that q(θi) is an increasing function of θi and satisfies the Inada conditions:
i) q(0) = 0, ii) lim
θi→+0
q(θi)
0 =∞, iii) lim
θi→+∞
q(θi)
0 = 0.
A searching worker meets a vacancy at the Poisson rateM(vi, si)/si = q(θi). A vacancy
is in turn contacted by a worker at the Poisson rate M(vi, si)/vi = q(θi)/θi. For
notational reasons I define:
λi ≡ q(θi), and ηi ≡ q(θi)/θi.
Bargaining
48 CHAPTER 3.
Wages are negotiated by unions and an employers’ association. The unions’ bargaining
power is given by β. Thus, for each skill level i ∈ {s, u} the agreed wage is given by
wi = βF
0
li (lu, ls + lt) , (3.1)
where F 0li (lu, ls + lt) denotes the marginal product of a worker with skill level i. Firms
and workers take these wages as given when they make their decisions. In Section 7, I
allow for individual bargaining.
3.3 Individuals’ Behavior
As new market entrants are unemployed, they start to search for a job. Once employed
the individual can be oﬀered training. This enables him to search for a skilled job
afterwards if he is not promoted by his current employer. The flow value of being
unemployed as unskilled worker is given by (r + δ)U . At the rate λu he meets an
unskilled job vacancy and gets the wage wu.
(r + δ)U = λumax [Vu(wu)− U, 0] . (3.2)
The value of being employed as an unskilled worker at wage wu is given by Vu(wu),
(r + δ)Vu(wu) = wu + γmax [Vt(wt)− Vu(wu), 0] , (3.3)
where the current employer oﬀers the worker a training contract at rate γ. A trainee
is promoted with probability ρ by the current employer. At the same time he can
search for a skilled job vacancy at another firm (and matches with probability λs).
The implicit assumption that the firm matches the outside wage when promoting its
trainee is without loss of generality. Promoting and paying a wage less than ws cannot
be optimal since the trainees would still search and leave at the same rate λs as before.
Paying a higher wage would reduce the firms profit. The value of being employed as
trainee at wage wt is thus given by
(r + δ)Vt(wt) = wt + (λs + ρ)max [Vts(ws)− Vt(wt), 0] . (3.4)
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The value for a former trainee to be employed as skilled worker at wage ws is given by:
(r + δ)Vts(ws) = ws. (3.5)
The four Bellman equations (3.2), (3.3), (3.4), and (3.5) can be used to derive the
conditions under which it is profitable for a worker to change status and hence to start
actively searching for a vacancy in the corresponding labor market.
For a trainee to search for a skilled job vacancy, it has to be true that the wage for
a skilled worker has to exceed the wage earned as trainee:
Vts(ws) > Vt(wt) ⇔ ws > wt. (3.6)
For an employed unskilled worker to accept the training contract, the value of being
employed as trainee Vt(wt) must be at least as great as the value of being employed as
unskilled worker Vu(wu)2
Vt(wt) ≥ Vu(wu) ⇔
(r + δ)wt + (λs + ρ)ws
r + δ + λs + ρ
≥ wu. (3.7)
In other words, the expected wage income from starting as a trainee and later being
employed (with probability λs+ ρ) as a skilled worker has to exceed or be equal to the
current wage earned as an unskilled worker.
Since it will be optimal for the firm to oﬀer a wage wt such that the worker is
indiﬀerent between accepting and rejecting condition (3.7) will hold with equality if
workers are not credit constrained. If workers are credit constrained, then the training
wage is bounded below by zero, i.e. wt ≥ 0. Furthermore, the firm can choose its
promotion strategy ρ, which allows the firm to reduce the turnover of trained workers.
By increasing the promotion rate the firm is able to lower the wage wt acceptable to a
trainee to make the worker indiﬀerent between staying unskilled or being trained.
Returning to the individual’s behavior, it follows from condition (3.7) that condition
(3.6) is satisfied as long as ws > wu.
2This condition does not require a strict inequality, since workers are oﬀered training
contracts without the necessity to participate in search.
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3.4 Steady State Turnover
Unemployment Measures
For every individual who leaves the labor market, a new individual enters unemploy-
ment as an unskilled worker. Thus, the measure δm of individuals enter the unem-
ployment pool as unskilled workers. The measure λuuu of unemployed exit into em-
ployment. In addition, there are some individuals, i.e. δuu, that exit the labor market
before finding a job. The steady state unemployment measures of unskilled workers is
uu =
δ
λu + δ
m. (3.8)
Employment Measures
Since only one wage prevails in each labor market, workers cannot improve their sit-
uation by searching for an identical job. Consequently, only unemployed and trainees
search.
The inflow into employment out of unemployment is given by λuuu. Workers of
every type exit employment at the rate δli. From the unskilled labor force γlu become
trainees, so that the measure of employed unskilled workers is given by
lu =
λu
γ + δ
uu =
λu
λu + δ
δ
γ + δ
m. (3.9)
The outflow from unskilled labor γlu equals the inflow into the measure of trainees.
The outflow from the trainee status is made up by the sum of individuals who exit the
labor market altogether (i.e. δlt), and by the individuals who find a skilled job vacancy
at another firm or are promoted by their current firm (i.e. (λs + ρ) lt). The measure
of trainees is hence given by
lt =
γ
δ + λs + ρ
lu =
δ
δ + λs + ρ
λu
λu + δ
γ
γ + δ
m. (3.10)
Skilled workers are recruited internally and externally. From the pool of employed
trainees λslt are recruited externally and ρlt internally. Given the outflow of δls from
skilled labor the total measure of skilled labor is
ls =
λs + ρ
δ
lt =
λs + ρ
δ + λs + ρ
λu
λu + δ
γ
γ + δ
m. (3.11)
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Note, that the sum of trainees and skilled workers is independent of ρ, since promotion
alters the status of the workers but not their role in production
lt + ls =
λu
λu + δ
γ
γ + δ
m. (3.12)
For later analysis, let us briefly focus on the ratio of skilled to unskilled labor, which
determines the marginal product of the respective labor forces and hence their wages
in equilibrium
lt + ls
lu
=
γ
δ
. (3.13)
The ratio increases with γ, the rate at which unskilled workers are recruited as trainees,
but is independent of the promotion strategy ρ and the labor market frictions of either
market. If a firm does not train while all other firms do but recruits skilled workers
from the external market, it is able to achieve a labor ratio of
ls
lu
=
λs + ρ
δ + λs + ρ
γ
δ
, (3.14)
which depends on the other firms training γ and promotion rate ρ.
Measure of Searching Individuals
The measure of individuals searching for unskilled job vacancies are the unskilled un-
employed, i.e. su = uu. Employed unskilled workers have no incentive to search for an
identical job at another firm, since they would just earn the same wage.
The measure of workers searching for skilled job vacancies are the trainees, i.e.
ss = lt =
δ
δ + λs + ρ
λu
λu + δ
γ
γ + δ
m. (3.15)
Since firms are small, they influence ss through γ and ρ without taking it into account.
By granting more unskilled workers general training, firms increase the pool of people
searching for skilled job vacancies. This makes it easier for other firms to recruit skilled
labor. The resulting externality does not automatically lead to ineﬃcient investment
into training, as shown in the next section.
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3.5 Firms’ Behavior
Firms maximize their present value. The instruments at hand are to create vacancies vi
for unskilled and skilled workers, to oﬀer unskilled workers general training contracts
at rate γ, to determine the trainee-wage wt and to decide how many trainees ρ are
promoted and given a full skilled worker’s contract. The firm takes the wages for
skilled and unskilled workers as given. Formally
max
vi,γ,ρ
π =
∞Z
0
⎛
⎝F (lu, ls + lt)−
X
i∈{s,u}
[wili + avi]− wtlt − γluc
⎞
⎠ e−rtdt (3.16)
s.t. l˙u = ηuvu − (γ + δ) lu
l˙t = γlu − (δ + λs + ρ) lt
l˙s = ηsvs + ρlt − δls
wt =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
wu − (λs + ρ)
ws − wu
r + δ
≥ 0,
if workers are credit constrained and
wu − (λs + ρ)
ws − wu
r + δ
, if not.
.
The total training costs for a firm is γluc, which equals the inflow of new trainees
multiplied by the cost of education. The firm contacts a worker with probability ηi per
vacancy, so that the inflow out of unemployment into the skilled and unskilled labor
force is given by ηivi.
Note that the marginal product of a trainee is the same as the marginal product
of a skilled worker, since I assume that training is instantaneous. Denote xi as the
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co-state variable associated with (3.16). Then the resulting Euler-conditions are:
∂H
∂vu
= a− ηuxu
!
= 0
∂H
∂vs
= a− ηsxs
!
= 0
dxu
dt
= xur − F 0lu (lu, ls + lt) + wu + cγ + xu (δ + γ)− xtγ
dxt
dt
= xtr − F 0ls (lu, ls + lt) + wt + xt (δ + λs + ρ)− xsρ
dxs
dt
= xsr − F 0ls (lu, ls + lt) + ws + xsδ
∂H
∂γ
= −c+ xt − xu != 0
∂H
∂ρ
= −xt + xs != 0
wt =
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
wu − (λs + ρ)
ws − wu
r + δ
≥ 0,
if workers are credit constrained and
wu − (λs + ρ)
ws − wu
r + δ
, if not.
Recruitment Cost
The steady state solution to this problem gives the vacancy creation condition for each
labor market, i.e.
a = η∗i
F 0li (lu, ls + lt)− wi
r + δ
for i ∈ {s, u} . (3.17)
The vacancy creation condition requires that the cost of creating a vacancy a equals
the expected return of a match. In the simple Pissarides (2000) model the vacancy
creation condition determines together with the zero profit condition the number of
firms (vacancies) in equilibrium. Here, the measure of firms is fixed to unity, so that
the vacancy creation condition determines the size of a firm. This also guarantees that
the value of creating a vacancy is equal to zero.
Proposition 1: Given all other firms engage in training, the recruitment cost for
skilled labor is higher than for unskilled labor.
Proof: Define Φ(θi) ≡ aθi/q(θi). Given the properties of the matching function, it
follows that
Φ0(θi) > 0, Φ00(θi) < 0, lim
θi→+0
Φ(θi) = 0 and lim
θi→+∞
Φ(θi) =∞.
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Hence, Φ(θi) is a strictly increasing and concave function of θi, with domain [0,∞) and
range [0,∞).
Denote eF 0li(θs, γ) ≡ F 0li(lu, lt + ls), where γ is the training rate of all other firms.
From (3.14) and the properties of the production function, it follows that the marginal
product of an unskilled worker is increasing in θs and the marginal product of a skilled
worker is decreasing in θs if the firm does not train. If it trains the marginal product
for each skill level is independent of search frictions, see equation (3.13). Hence, a
strictly positive and unique θ∗i exists, where Φ(θ
∗
i ) = eF 0li(θ∗s, γ).
Since all other firms train, the training rate γ is such that eF 0ls(θs, γ) > eF 0lu(θs, γ). Given
equation (3.1) it follows that F 0ls (lu, ls + lt) − ws > F 0lu (lu, ls + lt) − wu whether the
firm trains or not. Thus, according to equation (3.17) the recruitment cost of a skilled
worker is higher than for an unskilled worker, i.e.
avs
M(vs, ss)
>
avu
M(vu, su)
.
¤
Rearranging equation (3.17) shows that the recruitment cost per match equals the
discounted marginal revenue of a matched worker.
avi
M(vi, si)
=
F 0li (lu, ls + lt)− wi
r + δ
In equilibrium the cash flow (i.e. F 0li (lu, ls + lt) − wi) of a skilled worker is greater
than the cash flow of an unskilled worker. The firm will therefore pay more for the
recruitment of a skilled worker than for an unskilled worker. While for a firm it is
harder to find skilled workers than unskilled workers (i.e. η∗s < η
∗
u), the matching
technology implies that it is easier for searching skilled individuals to find a vacancy
than for unskilled individuals (i.e. λ∗s > λ
∗
u).
Firms make zero profit, since they pay one part of the marginal product for re-
cruitment and the other part in wages to workers themselves. Thus, firms that recruit
trained workers pay them their eﬀective marginal product and hence do not profit from
recruiting trained workers. The fact that the future employer of a trained worker does
not benefit from the training in other firms implies that search frictions per se need
not cause underinvestment in training.
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Promotion Decision
The firm can use promotion to prevent trainees from searching for a skilled job vacancy
at another employer. The promotion condition requires that the shadow value of a
trainee equals the shadow value of a skilled worker
∂H
∂ρ
= −xt + xs != 0. (3.18)
The value of a trainee xt after substituting the trainee wage wt out is given by
xt =
F 0ls (lu, ls + lt)− wt + ρxs
r + δ + λs + ρ
, (3.19)
which implies that xt < xs for all ρ, except for ρ → ∞, where xt = xs. Hence, it is
optimal for the firm to promote at the highest rate possible. If workers are not credit
constrained, then they can be promoted immediately, i.e. ρNC →∞, in turn for a lump-
sum payment that is equivalent to the value of the promotion, i.e. (ws − wu) / (r + δ),
because the firm can extract all rent from an unskilled worker when posting the training
contract. If workers are credit constrained, then it is optimal to chose the promotion
probability ρC such that the trainee wage is set to zero, i.e. wt = 0,
ρC = max
∙
(r + δ)
wu
ws − wu
− λs, 0
¸
. (3.20)
If the oﬀer arrival rate for skilled workers λs exceeds λs = (r + δ)wu/ (ws − wu), then
nobody is promoted, since workers will accept a trainee contract even without any
promotion promise by the training firm, as can be seen by substituting λs into condition
(3.7).
Training Decision
Firms promote all trainees if workers are not credit constrained, and thereby keep them
oﬀ the skilled labor market. This implies that workers do not benefit from training,
since they pay for their promotion up front. At the same time future employers do
not benefit from the training of other firms either, since all skilled workers stay with
their training firm. Thus, if workers are not credit constrained the training level will be
equal to the level of training in a competitive market, where workers pay for training.
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Proposition 2: If workers are not credit constrained, firms will provide training up to
the first best level, i.e. (r + δ) c = bF 0ls(γ∗)− bF 0lu(γ∗), where bF 0li(γ) ≡ F 0li(lu, lt + ls).
Proof: The rent extracted from the diﬀerence in recruitment cost isbF 0ls(γ∗)− ws
r + δ
−
bF 0lu(γ∗)− wu
r + δ
.
The lump-sum payment equivalent to the value of the promotion is given by
ws − wu
r + δ
.
Adding up gives the same training condition as in a competitive market, where worker
pay for training.
(r + δ) c = bF 0ls(γ∗)− bF 0lu(γ∗). (3.21)
Note that the diﬀerence in the marginal products between skilled and unskilled workers
is higher for firms that do not train than for training firms, since (lt + ls) /lu > ls/lu
according to equation (3.13) and (3.14). The return to training will therefore exceed
the cost of training so that training is optimal. ¤
If workers are credit constrained, then firms cannot extract all the rent from workers
by promoting them immediately. Firms will therefore pay a trainee wage wt = 0 and
promote at rate ρC given by equation (3.20).
The diﬀerence in recruitment costs can still be used to pay for the general training
of some unskilled workers. This can be seen by looking at the Euler equation, which
implies that the diﬀerence in the shadow value of a trainee and the shadow value of
employing an unskilled worker has to equal the cost of training (i.e. c = xt − xu). In
other words, the cost of general training has to equal the discounted cash flows between
trainees and unskilled workers. Using the first order conditions to subsitute the value
of being a trainee and an unskilled worker and rearranging gives
(r + δ) c =
¡
r + δ + ρC
¢
F 0ls (lu, ls + lt)− ρCws
r + δ + λs + ρC
− F 0lu (lu, ls + lt) + wu. (3.22)
Proposition 3: If workers are credit constrained and 0 < λs ≤ λs, where λs =
(r + δ)wu/ (ws − wu), the training level γ1 is below the first best level γ∗ (since trainees
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leave their training firm). For λs > λs the training level γ2 < γ1 < γ∗ is even lower,
since unskilled workers receive part of the return to training.
Proof: For 0 < λs ≤ λs and after substituting the promotion rate ρC for credit
constrained workers given in equation (3.20) and the wage for skilled workers out, the
training condition is according to equation (3.22) given by
(r + δ) c =
r + δ − (1− β)λs
r + δ
³ bF 0ls(γ1)− bF 0lu(γ1)´ . (3.23)
Comparing this condition to the competitive level
(r + δ) c = bF 0ls(γ∗)− bF 0lu(γ∗),
and noting that the marginal product of a skilled worker is decreasing in γ and the
marginal product of a unskilled worker is increasing in γ as well as noting that β ∈
(0, 1), it follows that γ1 < γ∗.
For λs > λs the training condition is according to equation (3.22) given by
(r + δ) c =
r + δ
r + δ + λs
bF 0ls(γ2)− (1− β) bF 0lu(γ2).
Substituting λs for λs implies
(r + δ) c < bF 0ls(γ2)− (2− β) bF 0lu(γ2). (3.24)
Substituting λs in equation (3.23) gives
(r + δ) c ≥ bF 0ls(γ1)− (2− β) bF 0lu(γ1). (3.25)
Comparing equation (3.24) and (3.25) gives γ2 < γ1.
The fact that workers get part of the return to training can be seen by looking at
equations (3.2) to (3.5) and comparing (i) wt = 0 and ρC = (r + δ) wuws−wu − λs with
(ii) wt = 0 and ρC = 0. In the case of (i) it follows according to condition (3.7) that
Vt(wt) = Vu(wu). In case of (ii) condition (3.7) holds with equality, i.e.
λs
r + δ + λs
ws >
λs
r + δ + λs
ws = wu,
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which implies Vt(wt) > Vu(wu). Hence unskilled workers gain from being trained. ¤
Although future employers do not benefit from employing trained workers, training
will be ineﬃcient as Proposition 3 shows, because workers are credit constrained. The
reason is that for the training firm to recover its training expenses fully, all trained
workers would have to stay with their training firm for their entire working life and
receive the wage of an unskilled worker. Outside firms are, however, willing to pay
them the wage of a skilled worker. This induces trained workers to search for another
employer.
The training firm can prevent workers from starting to search by promoting them
immediately and paying them the market wage of a high skilled worker. If workers are
not credit constrained, then the firm can make the worker indiﬀerent between being
unskilled or becoming a trainee. The reason is that the firm temporarily possesses
all the bargaining power when oﬀering the trainee contract. It can therefore demand
the value of the promotion as a lump-sum payment up-front. This guarantees that a
training firm gets all the return from training and will therefore invest eﬃciently.
If workers are credit constrained, then the training firm will try to extract as much
rent as possible from its trainees by setting the trainee wage equal to zero. In order to
get the worker to accept the trainee contract, the training firm commits to a certain
promotion rate, that makes the unskilled worker exactly indiﬀerent between becoming
a trainee or staying unskilled. Since workers are searching for a skilled job as long as
they are not promoted, training will be ineﬃcient due to worker turnover.
If the probability for trainees to get an outside oﬀer is high enough then the training
firm does not need to promise a promotion in order to get the worker to accept the
trainee contract. This in turn implies that with a high matching rate for skilled workers,
trainees profit from general training, since the training firm is not able to extract the
whole surplus from its trainee. Thus, the level of training provided by the firm will be
even lower.
3.6. LABOR MARKET EQUILIBRIUM 59
3.6 Labor Market Equilibrium
The aim of this section is to show that in an economy with credit constrained workers
there may be multiple training equilibria. If workers are not credit constrained, pro-
motion in turn for an equivalent lump-sum payment from the trainee to the training
firm prevents trainees from quitting and leads to a unique labor market equilibrium.
Definition: Labor Market Equilibrium
A labor market equilibrium satisfies the following conditions: Firms create vacancies
according to (3.17), oﬀer general training at rate γ satisfying (3.22) if workers are
credit constrained and (3.21) if workers are not credit constrained and are promoted
immediately. Workers follow an optimal search strategy according to (3.2) - (3.5) and
bargaining wages are formed according to (3.1).
Proposition 4: If workers are not credit constrained, then a unique labor market
equilibrium exists.
If workers are credit constrained, multiple equilibria with ineﬃcient training can exist,
where a high training equilibrium is sustained by a low matching rate for trainees and
vice versa, i.e. for any two equilibria a and b, I have λas < λ
b
s and γ
∗ > γa > γb.
Proof: Part 1: Existence and uniqueness if workers are not credit constrained.
Since bF 0ls(γ)− bF 0lu(γ) goes to infinity for γ → 0 and to zero for γ →∞, a unique γ∗ > 0
for the training rate in equation (3.21) exists. The wages are w∗u, w
∗
s and the market
tightness θ∗u, θ
∗
s are functions of γ
∗ via the marginal product of a worker but not vice
versa. Thus, the vacancy creation condition (3.17) implies a unique market tightness
θ∗i for each market. Wages are uniquely determined by equation (3.1) via the marginal
product.
Part 2: Existence and multiplicity, if workers are credit constrained.
Again the property of the production function implies that γj > 0 for j = 1, 2 for the
training rate in equation (3.22) exists. To establish the possibility of multiplicity it
is suﬃcient to show that there are multiple (θ∗s, γ
j) that satisfy the vacancy creation
condition (3.17) for skilled workers and the training equation (3.22). The training
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condition can be written as
(r + δ) c = fj (θ
∗
s)F
0
ls(γ
j)− hjF
0
lu(γ
j), (3.26)
where
f1 (θ
∗
s) =
r + δ − (1− β)λs
r + δ
and h1 = 1 for j = 1 and
f2 (θ
∗
s) =
r + δ
r + δ + λs
and h2 = 1− β for j = 2.
Note that fj (θ
∗
s) is decreasing in θ
∗
s and the rhs of equation (3.26) is decreasing in γ
j.
In the vacancy creation condition (3.17) the rhs is decreasing in θ∗s and in γ
j. Thus,
multiple equilibria a and b can exist for γa > γb and θ∗as < θ
∗b
s . ¤
If workers are credit constrained, firms are deprived of the promotion instrument,
and general training generates a search externality since firms do not take into account
that by training they increase the pool ss of people searching for skilled job vacancies
— compare equation (3.15) — and that by doing so it becomes harder for other trainees
to find a job. This lower separation rate increases the firm’s return to general training,
which sustains a high training level and a low market tightness for skilled labor. On
the other side, a low training equilibrium can exist where the probability for trainees
to find a job at another firm is high. This decreases the return to general training such
that firms train less, which sustains a high matching rate for trainees.
Only if unskilled workers are not credit constrained can the current firm extract
the whole rent from general training and prevent its trainees from searching. This
eliminates this externality and leads to an eﬃcient investment in general training.
3.7 Extensions
Individual Bargaining
Assume that wages are negotiated after a worker contacted a firm. Firms take these
wages as given then; they choose the number of vacancies, the training rate and the
promotion rate. Nature chooses with probability β the worker to make an oﬀer and
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with probability 1−β the firm. Workers and firms are assumed to have some bargaining
power (i.e. 0 > β > 1). If the other party accepts the oﬀer, a wage contract is written
and production starts immediately thereafter. If the oﬀer is rejected, the respondent
can leave the negotiation table and continue searching (both parties), or he can wait
for the bargaining game to start again next period.
During this period the worker receives the flow-utility of leisure normalized to zero,
since an employed worker has to take a day leave while bargaining with a diﬀerent
firm. The firm makes no loss or gain, since it does not advertise the job vacancy during
negotiations.
At the same time there is a positive probability δdt that the worker exits the labor
market. This could result in a breakdown of the negotiations, where the worker receives
a flow utility of zero and the firm continues searching with the unfilled vacancy, which
has a value of zero due to free entry. The firm’s payoﬀ while negotiations are postponed
is also zero, as mentioned above.
The outside options of the workers are to take another day leave which gives him
zero utility. The outside option for a firm is to walk away and to search for another
worker. Since the value of a vacancy (i.e. searching) is zero in equilibrium, the outside
option of the firm has a value of zero.
In case of a breakdown, payoﬀs are zero. The outside and the inside options are
not binding so that the bargaining model simplifies to a random proposer Rubinstein
model. Furthermore, the fact that the discount rates for firms and workers are identical
implies that the bargaining power is equivalent to the probability of being chosen by
nature to make an oﬀer. Muthoo (1999, ch. 3.2 and 7.2.4) shows that the solution to
the bargaining scenario - as dt→ 0 - is given by
w∗i = βF
0
li (lu, ls + lt) .
The assumption that an employed worker receives only the value of leisure and not his
wage while negotiations are postponed ensures a single wage for each type of labor. This
implies that employed workers do not gain by searching for an identical job at another
firm. Therefore, only the unemployed and trainees will search. This assumption is
relaxed below.
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On-the-job Search and Search Intensity
In the preceding analysis the bargaining game was chosen such that only unemployed
and trainees searched but not the skilled and unskilled workers. If one assumes that
the inside option of a worker is his current wage and not the value of leisure, then
on-the-job search will arise since workers can increase their wage every time they meet
a new employer, i.e.
wi,e = (1− β)wi,e−1 + βF 0li (lu, ls + lt) , (3.27)
where e is an index for the number of employers the worker was/is employed with and
wi,e−1 indicates the wage at the last employer or in the case of the first employer the
value of leisure normalized to zero. Thus, employed workers will continue searching as
long as they earn less than their marginal product.
Promotion would keep trainees away from the skilled labor market and lead to
eﬃcient investment in general training if workers are not credit constrained, since the
training firm can recover the promotion cost up-front via a lump-sum payment for
training equivalent to the cost of promotion. If workers are not credit constrained,
then the training firm will not promote the trained workers. It can, however, reduce
the trainee wage in order to capture the future wage increases the worker expects to
get from searching on-the-job.
The result that training firms do not promote, or demand the lowest possible trainee
wage, only changes if the search intensity is no longer fixed and costless for workers.
To introduce search intensity I follow Pissarides (2000). The matching rate depends
not only on the market tightness θi, but also on a worker’s search intensity σi,e, which
will vary with his wage and thus with the number of jobs he already occupied, and it
will depend on the average search intensity σi of all workers from his skill group. The
transition rate for a worker is therefore given by
σi,eφi ≡ σi,e
q(σi, θi)
σi
= σi,e
M(vi, σisi)
σisi
.
Assume that the search cost function k (σi,e) is convex and k (0) = 0, then the Bellman
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equation for a trainee is given by:
(r + δ)V (wt,e) = max
σt,e
[wt,e − k (σt,e) + σt,eφt (V (wt,e+1)− V (wt,e))] .
It follows that the optimal search intensity equates the marginal cost of searching with
the marginal expected gain from being employed at the new employer at wage wt,e+1,
i.e.
∂k (σt,e)
∂σt,e
= φt (V (wt,e+1)− V (wt,e)) .
The convex search cost function and the fact that the expected utility gain of changing
employer, i.e. V (wt,e+1) − V (wt,e), decreases3 with a higher current wage guarantees
that each trainee will search less if his current wage is higher. However, trainees will
continue to search as long as they earn less than their marginal product. Nevertheless,
firms might be able to extract some rent from their trainees by promoting them imme-
diately after training since the promotion saves the trainees search costs and reduces
their incentive to search more intensively. A firm will promote a trainee, i.e. pay him
a wage ws,e > wt,e, if and only if the lower matching probability compensates the firm
for the cost of promotion, i.e.
max
ws,e∈(wt,e,F 0ls (lu,ls+lt))
£
F 0ls (lu, ls + lt)− ws,e + σs,eφs [0− J (ws,e)]
¤
> F 0li (lu, ls + lt)− wt,e + σt,eφt [0− J (wt,e)] ,
where J (wi,e) is the value of employing a worker at wage wi,e. If the worker leaves,
then the value to the firm is zero. Provided the convexity of the search cost function
is severe enough, then the training firm will promote its trained workers.
3.8 Conclusion
The model presented in this chapter shows that in a search model where vacancy
creation drives profits down to zero such that future employers of trained workers do
3This can easily be seen from equation (3.27) and the fact that V (wt,e) is bounded
above by the discounted sum of the workers marginal product.
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not benefit from the training in other firms, then firm’s investment into general training
will only be below the competitive level if workers are credit constrained. The reason
is that unskilled workers have to pay their expected gain from training to the training
firm in exchange for being trained.
If workers are credit constrained, then the training firm cannot recover the cost of
training, since trained workers will search for a better paid job. This, however, does not
imply that trainees will benefit from training, since the firm can extract the worker’s
expected gain from searching for another employer by paying him a low trainee wage
as long as the worker stays with the training firm. Only if the trainee wage is bounded
by the workers’ credit constraints do trainees gain from training.
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